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Abstract
In many situations, from economists predicting unemployment rates to chemists es-
timating fuel safety, individuals have differing opinions or predictions. We consider
the wisdom-of-the-crowd problem of aggregating the judgments of multiple individ-
uals on a single question, when no outside information about their competence is
available. Many standard methods select the most popular answer, after correcting
for variations in confidence. Using a formal model, we prove that any such method
can fail even if based on perfect Bayesian estimates of individual confidence, or, more
generally, on Bayesian posterior probabilities. Our model suggests a new method for
aggregating opinions: select the answer that is more popular than people predict. We
derive theoretical conditions under which this new method is guaranteed to work, and
generalize it to questions with more than two possible answers. We conduct empiri-
cal tests in which respondents are asked for both their own answer to some question
and their prediction about the distribution of answers given by other people, and
show that our new method outperforms majority and confidence-weighted voting in
a range of domains including geography and trivia questions, laypeople and profes-
sionals judging art prices, and dermatologists evaluating skin lesions. We develop
and evaluate a probabilistic generative model for crowd wisdom, including applying
it across questions to determine individual respondent expertise and comparing it to
various Bayesian hierarchical models. We extend our new crowd wisdom method to
operate on domains where the answer space is unknown in advance, by having respon-
dents predict the most common answers given by others, and discuss performance on
a cognitive reflection test as a case study of this extension.
Thesis Supervisor: Drazen Prelec
Title: Digital Equipment Corporation Leaders for
Global Operations Professor of Management
Thesis Supervisor: Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Title: Professor of Computational Cognitive Science
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2-1 Two example questions from Study ic, described in text. (a) Major-
ity opinion is incorrect for question (P). (b) Majority opinion is cor-
rect for question (C). (c) and (d). Respondents give their confidence
that their answer is correct from 50% (chance) to 100% (certainty).
Weighting votes by confidence does not change majority opinion, since
respondents voting for both answers are roughly equally confident. (e)
Respondents predict the frequency of Yes votes, shown as estimated
percent agreement with their own answer. Those answering Yes believe
that most others will agree with them, while those answering No be-
lieve that most others will disagree. The surprisingly popular answer
discounts the more predictable votes, reversing the incorrect major-
ity verdict in (P). (f) The predictions are roughly symmetric, and so
the surprisingly popular answer does not overturn the correct majority
verdict in (C ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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2-2 Why "surprisingly popular" answers should be correct and confidence-
weighted voting is insufficient, illustrated by simple models of Philadel-
phia and Columbia questions with Bayesian respondents. (a) The cor-
rect answer is more popular in the actual world than in the counterfac-
tual world. (b) Respondents' vote predictions interpolate between the
two possible worlds. In both models, interpolation is illustrated by a
voter with 2/3 confidence in Yes and a voter with 5/6 confidence in No.
The prediction of the Yes voter is closer to the percentage in the Yes
world, and the prediction of the No voter is closer to the percentage in
the No world. Both predictions lie between actual and counterfactual
percentages. (c) follows from (a) and (b). The correct answer is the
one that is more popular in the actual world than predicted - the
"surprisingly popular" answer. The example also proves that any algo-
rithm based on votes and confidences can fail even with ideal Bayesian
respondents. The two questions have different correct answers, while
the actual vote splits and confidences are the same. Numerical con-
fidences were constructed from a Bayesian model in which the actual
world is drawn according to a prior probability distribution, represent-
ing evidence that is common knowledge among all respondents. A
respondent's vote is generated by tossing the coin corresponding to
the actual world. A respondent uses their vote as private evidence to
update the prior into posterior probabilities via Bayes' rule. For exam-
ple, a Yes voter for Philadelphia would compute posterior probability
of 2/3 = (7/12) x (20/21)/((7/12) x (20/21) + (5/12) x (2/3)) that Yes
is correct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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probability of a chance correct decision, computed -according to answer
percentages generated by the algorithm. Confidence was not elicited
in Studies lab, 4ab. However, in 4ab we use scale values as proxy for
confidence (Lebreton et al., 2015), giving extreme categories (on a four
point scale) twice as much weight in scale-weighted voting, and 100%
weight in max-scale. The results for Individual are average kappa-s
across all individuals. SP is consistently the best performer across all
studies. Results using Matthews correlation coefficient, Fl-score, and
percent correct are similar (Figs. 2-4, 2-5,2-6). . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2-4 Performance of all methods across all studies, shown with respect to the
Matthews correlation coefficient. Error bars are bootstrapped standard
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squared, p < 0.05). Performance is unbiased if a line passes through
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the methods as a function of consensus, treating the Study la,b,c re-
sults described in the text as providing 150 questions. Histograms
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Introduction: Crowd wisdom and
information aggregation
1.1 The promise of crowd wisdom
Consider the following four scenarios:
(a) Chemists are asked to estimate the relative safety of new proposed fuels for au-
tomobiles by considering both their physical properties and potential accidents.
(b) Economists and political scientists are asked to produce forecasts about eco-
nomic and political events in various countries, for example the probable out-
come of an ongoing regional conflict.
(c) Doctors are asked to diagnose whether a possibly cancerous tumor is benign or
malignant.
(d) Consumers are asked about how likely they are to make use of various products
in the future which have not yet been introduced into the market.
It is a truism that groups of people, particularly groups of experts, are a better source
of answers to questions like the above than a single individual1 and indeed groups
'The quote from the cover of the bestseller "The Wisdom of Crowds" (Surowiecki, 2005) is typical
of this enthusiasm: "Large groups of people are smarter than an elite few, no matter how brilliant
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of people make these kinds of judgments and decisions every day. The impressive
successes of such (sometimes large) groups of people are catalogued in "The Wisdom of
Crowds" (Surowiecki, 2005) and "Infotopia" (Sunstein, 2006), both of which forcefully
argue for the role of the dispersed judgments of the many in policy making. Recent
applications of crowd wisdom include political and economic forecasting (Budescu
and Chen, 2014; Mellers et al., 2014), corporate decision making (Bonabeau, 2009),
and healthcare (Brabham et al., 2014). Crowds have similarly been used to evaluate
nuclear safety (Cooke and Goossens, 2008), public policy(Morgan, 2014) the quality
of chemical probes, (Oprea et al., 2009) and even possible responses to a restless
volcano (Aspinall, 2010).
1.1.1 The challenge posed by this promise
The search for crowd wisdom, however raises a challenge: how can this wisdom best
be extracted from individual judgments? That is, how should the judgments of indi-
viduals in a group be aggregated, and how can expertise be identified?
The focus of this thesis is on how to aggregate answers from a number of individu-
als who have independently given their answer to some question or their opinion about
some issue. This enables one to aggregate the opinions of large, dispersed groups of
individuals who give their opinions at different times and to additionally avoid some
of the potentially negative effects of discussion (Lorenz et al., 2011), including group
polarisation (Myers and Lamm, 1976; Sunstein, 2002; Isenberg, 1986). 2 More specif-
ically, this thesis answers the the question of how to aggregate information from a
number of individuals for a single, unique question where no outside information is
available. Some statistical methods, such as the existing Bayesian hierarchical models
we will discuss, require data from multiple questions, either because this is required
to learn respondent-level parameters or because an individual's historical accuracy is
- better at solving problems, fostering innovation, coming to wise decisions, even predicting the
future."
2This focus does not imply, of course, that group discussion should always be avoided or ignored;
see (Mellers et al., 2014) for a recent success that included having individuals in the group interact.
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used as model input thus limiting the application of such methods.3 Thus, while we
will extend the crowd wisdom models that we develop to apply across data from mul-
tiple questions (Chapter 3) which has various advantages when this data is available,
we will primarily focus on models and methods that do not require this.
1.1.2 The scope of this thesis
Beyond the specific questions described above, we also restrict our scope in a num-
ber of other ways. First, we only consider aggregating group judgments or beliefs,
not group preferences. Hanson (2013) gives one possible defense of this restriction
to beliefs. Second, we assume that respondents are answering honestly, rather than
attempting (either individually or through collusion) to engage in deception or force
a particular answer to be chosen. As we will discuss, however, there are methods to
incentivize respondents to answer honestly that use the same inputs as our aggrega-
tion methods, and many of the empirical studies we discuss are incentive compatible.
Third, the thesis discusses how to aggregate answers to categorical questions with
a finite number of answers, rather than questions where the answer is a continuous
quantity. We leave extending these methods to domains with continuous answers
to future work, but remark that one can go a long way towards aggregating conti-
nous quantities by asking a series of binary questions about whether the continuous
quantity is over or under some point, or by discretizing the continuous quantitiy (not
necessarily uniformly) and then treating it as a categorical variable.
1.2 Previous approaches to aggregating information
from the crowd
There is now a large literature suggesting answers to these question of how to extract
crowd wisdom. There are both mathematical methods for aggregation (for reviews
see Cooke (1991); Clemen and Winkler (1999, 2007); Ouchi (2004)) and behavioral
3 Even in cases where respondents have answered other questions, it is often difficult to assess
respondent's historical performance (Tetlock, 2005; Denrell and Fang, 2010).
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methods (for reviews see Cooke (1991); Clemen and Winkler (1999)), which in turn
draw on work on decision making in groups and organizations (for reviews see Kerr
and Tindale (2004); Tindale and Kluwe (2015); Larrick et al. (2011)).
1.2.1 Voting and averaging
In broad strokes, the prevalent answer to the question of how to aggregate crowd wis-
dom has changed little since Galton's demonstration that the average estimate of a
group of county fairgoers juding the weight of an ox was remarkably accurate (Galton,
1907c,a,b): 'epistemic democracy', or, more specifically, select the average opinion.
Standard methods of information aggregation, and the focus of much research, in-
volve essentially selecting the modal opinion: majority vote in the case of categorical
judgments (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Keuschnigg and Ganser, 2016; DeGroot,
1974; Grofman et al., 1983; Hastie and Kameda, 2005; Ladha, 1992) or selecting the
mean opinion in the case of continous judgments, including judgments of probabilities
(Ashton and Ashton, 1985; Makridakis and Winkler, 1983). Alternatives to selecting
the arithmetic mean include computing trimmed means (Jose et al., 2013), averaging
quantiles rather than probabilities (Lichtendahl Jr et al., 2013), selecting the median
of the cumulative distribution function (Hora et al., 2013), and selecting the geometric
average (Genest et al., 1984).
1.2.1.1 Diversion: axiomatic justification for averaging methods
How are the averaging methods discussed above theoretically justified? Axiomatic ap-
proaches to aggregation consider how to combine probability distributions so that the
resulting distribution obeys certain attractive properties, and so derive restrictions
on the functional form of the resulting distribution (see Genest and Zidek (1986) and
French and Insua (2000) for reviews). The axiomatic approach has mostly considered
how to combine probability means given a weight associated with each mean, for
example a probability judgment from an individual and an expertise weight of some
kind associated with the individual. The two best known such solutions are averag-
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ing methods: the linear opinion pool, which uses the weighted sum of the probability
means, i.e. confidence-weighted voting, and the logarithmic opinion pool, which uses
the (appropriately normalized) product of the means with each mean raised to its
associated weight. The linear opinion pool posesses a desired property called the
marginalization property and the logarithmic opinion pool fulfills the principle of ex-
ternal Bayesianity. Whilst much attention has been paid to how to use the weights
in question, considerably less attention has been paid to principled ways to obtain
the weights,. Beyond methods that apply to single questions, the most widely used
method for aggregating expert opinions in this tradition, other than simply giving
equal weight to all experts, is Cooke's classical model (Cooke, 1991), which uses a
linear opinion pool with weights that are obtained from each individual's performance
answering questions about seed variables for which the true outcome is known. Each
individual's performance when estimating the seed variables is used to calculate cal-
ibration and informativeness scores that are together used to calculate the weight
assigned to each expert. Cooke and Goossens (2008) review the performance of the
classical model to aggregate opinions made by 45 expert panels over many domains.
1.2.1.2 Disadvantages of voting and averaging
Unfortunately, as this subsection discusses, simply selecting the majority or average
opinion is not always successful for a variety of reasons, although it has the advan-
tage that it is simple to apply and works well in some circumstances. For an excellent
extended survey of potential drawbacks of these methods see (Sunstein, 2006). The
major weakness of such democratic averaging is that it does not take into account
differences in individual competence, expertise or access to information, and eliciting
confidences from respondents does not adequately capture these differences (Koriat,
2012). Each individual has the same impact on the collective outcome, or, in con-
fidence weighted averaging, is free to determine their own level of impact. Such
methods are successful at identifying the correct answer only in so-called 'kind' en-
vironments (Hertwig, 2012), where individuals with the best information are either
the most confident or the most numerous. They fail in 'wicked' environments, for
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example, when many people in the group have misleading intuitions (Simmons et al.,
2011) or when unknowedgeable or unskilled people give extreme forecasts (Evgeniou
et al., 2013).
A standard justification for trusting the average or majority opinion of large groups
of people is the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785), which, loosely, states
that if a group of people answer a binary question and each individual answers in-
dependently and has more than 50% chance of being correct then the probability
that majority vote is correct tends towards 100% as the group size increases towards
infinity. There is now a large literature concerning extensions and variations of Con-
cordet's original idea; see (Sunstein, 2006) for a survey of this literature. Whilst this
kind of argument is normally used to motivate selecting the average or consensus an-
swer, the darker side of this theorem follows immediately: if the majority of the group
have less than a 50% chance of giving the correct answer, then the probability that
majority vote is correct falls towards zero as the group size increases. In situations,
therefore, in which many people have limited or misleading information or intuitions,
selecting the average answer may lead to an incorrect conclusion.
If each individual's answer accords with the information that they have available,
the majority answer will be biased towards informaton which is most widely avail-
able, rather than information which is most diagnostic of the truth. In particular,
democracy may overweight shallow information that is widely available and neglect
important information that is not widely dispersed, for example because it is new
or hard to understand. Furthermore, majority voting (or averaging) considers only
how people vote in the actual state of the world, without taking into account how
they might vote in other counterfactual world states. This matters, for example, in
situations in which most people are biased to vote in a particular direction in all
possible world states. For example, people may (for sensible reasons) be predisposed
to say that a tumor is malignant such that when the tumor is benign 65% of the
responding doctors say 'malignant' but if we could somehow probe votes for the same
tumor in the counterfactual world where it actually is malignant 90% of the doctors
would have said it is malignant. Lastly, selecting the majority or average opinion
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does not account for the prior over possible states of the world, independent of the
answers of respondents. That is, there may be some state of the world which is ex
ante extremely unlikely but which is such that it results in information dispersed in
such a way throughout the group that slightly favors it over some other state which is
much more likely ex ante. For all of these (related) reasons, the majority or average
opinion can result in the incorrect answer.
We should, of course, distinguish between cases where selecting the average opinion
arrives at the incorrect answer because everyone in the group was simply missing some
critical piece of information or the intrinsic irreducible uncertainty of the question is
simply too large (Tetlock, 2005), from situations where there were individuals in the
group who had sufficient information to answer correctly but selecting the average
answer did not weigh their opinions highly enough. It is the latter case where this
thesis will hope to provide a better alternative.
1.2.2 Market-based aggregation mechanisms
Whilst the mathematical methods for aggregation just surveyed have a long history,
more recently the internet has encouraged aggregation mechanisms that allow many
dispersed people interacting repeatedly to make predictions or form judgments. The
most widely used are prediction markets, in which people trade securities that pay off
depending on the outcome of a specified event, with the market price of the security
interpreted as the best collective estimate of the current probability of the event
(Anders and Batchelder, 2012; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Arrow et al., 2008). One
major application historically of prediction markets is election forecasting (Berg et al.,
2008), although they have also been tested, for example, in predicting NFL games (for
which they performed similarly to an expert opinion pool) (Chen et al., 2005), and
in numerous other contexts (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Prediction markets are
used within many organisations, especially businesses (Thompson, 2012; Waitz and
Mild, 2013), including large-scale prediction markets of various kinds at Google and
Ford Motor Company (Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015), and markets for sales forecasts
at Hewlett Packard (Plott and Chen, 2002). Companies have also run prediction
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markets with external traders, for example to forecast Google's market capitalization
prior to their initial public offering (Berg et al., 2009). Beyond prediction markets,
other market based mechanisms include preference markets (Dahan et al., 2010) and
securities trading of concepts (Dahan et al., 2011) which are intended to aid product
development by determining how consumers respond to different product concepts.
Other approaches in this literature have combined a market and a coordination game
to eliminate public knowledge biases (Chen et al., 2004), and, more recently, exploited
parimutuel betting to forecast sales at Intel (Plott et al., 2014) and to predict box
office revenue Court et al. (2018).
1.2.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of prediction markets
Prediction markets provide incentives for people to make accurate judgments by pay-
ing people depending on the outcome of their stock trades, and furthermore allow
people who purchase more stocks (reflecting how confident they are) to have a larger
impact on the final result. Importantly, prediction markets elicit from people not
only what information they have, but also implicitly ask people to reflect on how this
information or insight is distributed amongst the population and to what extent it
is already accounted for in the current stock price. However, prediction markets also
have several important disadvantages (Croxson, 2011). Primarily, they are limited
to predictions about events where it is possible to describe the the outcomes with a
precise contract. They thus cannot be applied to forecasts about counterfactuals (for
example, to forecast the results of several possible mutually exclusive public policies)
or about events that resolve in the far future (for example, to forecast whether tak-
ing some action now will have a particular consequence in twenty years). Beyond
this limitation, markets also require sufficient liquidity to enable accurate predictions
(Sunder, 1992; Ho and Chen, 2007), and their output is by definition available to
all market participants, which may be undesirable in some settings (Croxson, 2011).
They can suffer from the result of individuals interacting such as bubbles, informa-
tion cascades and contagion from wishful thinking (Seybert and Bloomfield, 2009;
Anderson and Holt, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990).
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1.2.3 Bayesian aggregation mechanisms
While the focus of this thesis is on aggregating answers to single, unique questions
for which no outside information is available, Bayesian models of aggregation can
be useful when the aggregator has a strong prior belief about the answer, or, more
commonly, has data from respondents answering multiple questions. In Chapter 3,
we develop a Bayesian probabilistic generative model that can be applied to single
questions but also make use of data from respondents answering multiple questions
and so we briefly discuss here previous Bayesian models of aggregation.
The idea behind the Bayesian approach to aggregating expert opinions is that
the aggregator has a prior belief over the variable of interest and updates this prior
with respect to a likelihood function associated with the answers of experts about
the variable of interest Winkler (1968); Morris (1977), for example the aggregator
may assume a uniform prior and treat each expert's opinion as a draw from a Beta
distribution. Clemen and Winkler (1990) compare Bayesian models for determining
the value of an indicator variable where each expert gives the probability that the
indicator variable is on. Bayesian models of aggregation also exist where the variable
of interest is a continuous probability, with most assuming a normal distributions
around the true probability (Winkler, 1981; Lipscomb et al., 1998).
More recently, a number of Bayesian hierarchical models have been developed in
computer science for aggregating information, including both answers to categorical
and continuous questions (Oravecz et al., 2013; Lee and Danileiko, 2014; Lee et al.,
2012, 2011b; Yi et al., 2010a). Such Bayesian hierarchical models can only be applied
to multiple questions and operate by learning the value of latent parameters, for
example respondent expertise, to better determine the aggregate answer. These kinds
of models will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 3. Bayesian hierarchical
models have also been developed for aggregating richer kinds of information, including
aggregating rank order information from human memory (Steyvers et al., 2009), an
extension that incorporates a paramter for individual expertise parameter (Lee et al.,
2011a), and a model for aggregating answers to the traveling salesperson problem (Yi
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et al., 2012).
1.2.4 Summary of previous approaches to aggregation
Leaving aside methods that rely on respondents answering multiple questions, we have
considered two major classes of aggregation mechanisms. First, statistical methods
that essentially extract the average or consensus answer in the group by selecting the
modal opinion or by computing some kind of average. Whilst such methods have
the advantage that they are democratic, easy to apply and preserve independence
of judgment, they can fail in environments where only a minority of experts have
the necessary information or insight, and where respondents do not realize this. An
alternative approach is to aggregate opinions using a market-based mechanism such as
prediction markets. While such methods potentially allow expert opinion to be highly
weighted, they are limited in that they only apply to judgments that are verifiable.
1.3 Thesis structure
In Chapter 2 (joint work with Sebastian Seung and Drazen Prelec), we develop a
new method of extracting crowd wisdom, which we call selecting the 'surprisingly
popular' answer. We propose a formal model of how Bayesian respondents vote and
predict the votes of other people, and show, under this model and the assumption
of an infinite sample of Bayesian respondents, that our new method is superior to
standard methods. We additionally show that across a range of empirical domains
our new method delivers good performance in practice.
In Chapter 3 (joint work with Drazen Prelec), we treat the crowd wisdom problem
as one of statistical inference. We develop a probabilistic generative model that builds
on the model we present in Chapter 2 to overcome various limitations of selecting the
surprisingly popular answer. Advantages of the probabilsitic generative model that
we develop include producing a complete posterior distribution over possible answers
(rather than simply which answer is more likely) and an ability to infer individual
respondent expertise by taking into account information across multiple questions
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that respondents have answered.
In Chapter 4 (joint work with Shane Frederick and Drazen Prelec), we extend our
aggregation methods to the case where the space of answers is unknown in advance,
and examine the answers and predictions of others that people give on a cognitive
reflection test as a case study.
Finally, we conclude the thesis with some brief remarks.
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Chapter 2
A solution to the single question
crowd wisdom problem
This chapter consists largely of material from Prelec, D., Seung, H. S., & McCoy, J.
(2017). A solution to the single-question crowd wisdom problem. Nature, 541(7638),
532-535 and its supplementary material, although includes some additional remarks
and figures.
2.1 Introduction
Once considered provocative (Galton, 1907c,a,b), the notion that the wisdom-of-the-
crowd is superior to any individual has itself become a piece of crowd wisdom, fueling
speculation that online voting may soon put credentialed experts out of business
(Sunstein, 2006; Surowiecki, 2005). Algorithms for extracting wisdom from the crowd
are typically based on a democratic voting procedure. They are simple to apply
and preserve independence of personal judgment (Lorenz et al., 2011). However,
democratic methods have serious limitations. They are biased for shallow, lowest-
common-denominator information, at the expense of novel or specialized knowledge
that is not widely shared (Chen et al., 2004; Simmons et al., 2011). Adjustments based
on measuring confidence do not solve this problem reliably (Hertwig, 2012). Here we
propose the following alternative to a democratic vote: Select the answer that is more
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popular than people predict. We prove that this principle yields the best answer under
reasonable assumptions about voter behavior, while the standard 'most popular' or
'most confident' principles fail under exactly those same assumptions. Like traditional
voting, the principle accepts unique problems, such as panel decisions about scientific
or artistic merit, and legal or historical disputes. The application domain is thus
distinct from that covered by machine learning and psychometric methods, which
require data acrosss multiple questions (Batchelder and Romney, 1988; Lee et al.,
2012; Yi et al., 2012; Lee and Danileiko, 2014; Anders and Batchelder, 2012; Oravecz
et al., 2013; Freund and Schapire, 1997) .
2.2 The surprisingly popular answer
To motivate our solution, imagine that you have no knowledge of U.S. geography and
are confronted with questions like:
(P) Philadelphia is the capital of Pennsylvania: Yes or No ?
(C) Columbia is the capital of South Carolina: Yes or No ?
You pose them to many people, hoping that majority opinion will be correct. This
works for (C), but most people endorse the incorrect answer Yes for (P), as shown
by the data in Figure 2-1(a, b). Most respondents may only recall that Philadelphia
is a large, historically significant city in Pennsylvania, and conclude that it is the
capital (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002). The minority who vote No likely possess
an additional piece of evidence, that the capital is Harrisburg. A large panel will
surely include such individuals. The failure of majority opinion cannot be blamed
on an uninformed panel or flawed reasoning, but represents a defect in the voting
method itself.
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Figure 2-1: Two example questions from Study 1c, described in text. (a) Majority
opinion is incorrect for question (P). (b) Majority opinion is correct for question (C).
(c) and (d). Respondents give their confidence that their answer is correct from 50%
(chance) to 100% (certainty). Weighting votes by confidence does not change majority
opinion, since respondents voting for both answers are roughly equally confident.
(e) Respondents predict the frequency of Yes votes, shown as estimated percent
agreement with their own answer. Those answering Yes believe that most others will
agree with them, while those answering No believe that most others will disagree.
The surprisingly popular answer discounts the more predictable votes, reversing the
incorrect majority verdict in (P). (f) The predictions are roughly symmetric, and so
the surprisingly popular answer does not overturn the correct majority verdict in (C).
A standard response to this problem is to weight votes by confidence. For binary
questions, confidence c implies a subjective probability c that a respondent's vote is
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correct and 1 - c that it is incorrect. Probabilities may be averaged linearly or non-
linearly, producing confidence-weighted voting algorithms (Cooke, 1991). However,
these succeed only if correct votes are accompanied by sufficiently greater confidence,
which is neither the case for (P) and (C), nor more generally (Koriat, 2012). As
shown by Figure 2-1(c, d), confidences associated with Yes and No votes are roughly
similar and do not override the incorrect majority in (P).
Here we propose an alternative algorithm that asks respondents to predict the
distribution of other people's answers to the question. The intuition underlying the
algorithm is as follows. Imagine that there are two possible worlds, the actual one
in which Philadelphia is not the capital of Pennsylvania, and the counterfactual one
in which Philadelphia is the capital. It is plausible that in the actual world fewer
people will vote Yes than in the counterfactual world. After all, in the actual world
where Philadelphia is not the capital, some fraction of respondents presumably know
the actual capital city and so would vote No. This can be formalized by the toss of
a biased coin where, say, the coin comes up Yes 60% of the time in the actual world
and 90% of the time in the counterfactual world. Majority opinion favors Yes in both
worlds. People know these coin biases (the vote frequencies in the different world
states) but they do not know which world is actual. Consequently, their predicted
frequency of Yes votes will be between 60% and 90%, say 80% on average. However,
the actual frequency of Yes votes will converge to 60% since Philadelphia is not the
capital and No will be the surprisingly popular, and correct, answer. Similarly, we
can consider the counterfactual world where Philadelphia is the capital city, and ask
what would happen if this world was actual. In this case, the frequency of Yes votes
would converge to 90% and Yes would be the surprisingly popular, answer and correct
in this case. Hence, the surprisingly popular answer selects the correct answer both
in the actual world, and in the counterfactual world.
We refer to this selection principle as the 'surprisingly popular' (SP) algorithm,
and define it rigorously in the next section (Theorem 2). In problem (P), the data
shows that respondents voting Yes believe that almost everyone will agree with them,
and respondents voting No also tend to believe that most people will vote Yes (Figure
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2-ie). On average, the predicted percentage of Yes votes is high, causing the actual
percentage for Yes to underperform relative to predictions. Therefore the surprisingly
popular answer is No, which is correct. In (C), by contrast, predictions of Yes votes
fall short of actual Yes votes. The surprisingly popular answer agrees with the popular
answer, and the majority verdict is correct (Figure 2-1f).
Could an equally valid algorithm be constructed using respondents' confidences?
Assume that respondents know the prior world probabilities and coin biases. Each
respondent observes the result of her private coin toss, and computes her confidence by
applying Bayes' rule. The hypothesized algorithm would need to identify the actual
coin from a large sample of reported confidences. Figure 2-2 proves by counterexample
that no such algorithm exists. It shows how identical distributions of confidences can
arise for two different biased coin problems, one where the correct answer is Yes and
one where the correct answer is No. Theorem I generalizes this counterexample.
Admittedly, real people may not conform to the idealized Bayesian model. Our point
is that if methods based on posterior probabilities (votes and confidences) fail for
ideal respondents, they are likely to fail for real respondents.
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Figure 2-2: Why "surprisingly popular" answers should be correct and confidence-
weighted voting is insufficient, illustrated by simple models of Philadelphia and
Columbia questions with Bayesian respondents. (a) The correct answer is more pop-
ular in the actual world than in the counterfactual world. (b) Respondents' vote pre-
dictions interpolate between the two possible worlds. In both models, interpolation
is illustrated by a voter with 2/3 confidence in Yes and a voter with 5/6 confidence
in No. The prediction of the Yes voter is closer to the percentage in the Yes world,
and the prediction of the No voter is closer to the percentage in the No world. Both
predictions lie between actual and counterfactual percentages. (c) follows from (a)
and (b). The correct answer is the one that is more popular in the actual world than
predicted - the "surprisingly popular" answer. The example also proves that any al-
gorithm based on votes and confidences can fail even with ideal Bayesian respondents.
The two questions have different correct answers, while the actual vote splits and con-
fidences are the same. Numerical confidences were constructed from a Bayesian model
in which the actual world is drawn according to a prior probability distribution, rep-
resenting evidence that is common knowledge among all respondents. A respondent's
vote is generated by tossing the coin corresponding to the actual world. A respon-
dent uses their vote as private evidence to update the prior into posterior probabilities
via Bayes' rule. For example, a Yes voter for Philadelphia would compute posterior
probability of 2/3 = (7/12) x (20/21)/((7/12) x (20/21) + (5/12) x (2/3)) that Yes
is correct. 38
By comparison, the SP algorithm has a theoretical guarantee, that it always selects
the best answer in light of available evidence (Theorem 2). Theorem 3 extends the
approach to multiple choice questions, and shows how vote predictions can identify
respondents that place highest probability on the correct answer. These results are
based on a common theoretical model that generalizes the biased coin example to
multiple, many-sided coins.
2.3 Possible world model and theoretical results
The formal model builds on the biased coin example, generalizing to m coins, each
coin having n possible sides. In part, this is a standard normative account of how
individuals should make inferences about hypotheses (coins) from data (toss outomes).
The additional assumption is that individuals take these inferences one step further,
and compute correct expectations of tosses observed by others. We will assume an
infinite sample of respondents.
A more complete Bayesian model would have parameters for respondent errors
and biases, and would also deal with the finite sample issue. We will consider such
a model in Chapter 3. However, it is important to first understand what can be
deduced from different types of input in the ideal case. This sets boundaries on what
one might expect to achieve with richer models.
We begin with a negative result, Theorem 1, that an infinite sample of correctly
computed posterior probabilities over coins is compatible with any possible coin (i.e.
answer) being correct. This reveals a limitation of methods based on posterior prob-
abilities, such as votes and confidences.
We then show how to determine the correct answer in three increasingly complex
settings: (1) m = 2,n > 2, (2) m = n > 2, (3) m,rn > 2. In particular, Theorem 2
proves that the surprisingly popular algorithm for binary questions described in the
main text is valid.
Extensions to multiple choice questions (m > 2 coins) rely on a key Lemma, which
Theorem 3 applies to the m = n > 2 case. We then consider the fully general m, n
39
problem, and indicate, without formal proof, how the correct answer can be derived if
in addition to vote predictions one also elicits posterior probabilities (whose elicitation
is not required for Theorems 2 and 3).
The results presented here which justifying choosing the surprisingly popular an-
swer assume ideal Bayesian respondents. However, the biased coin argument pre-
sented in the main text remains valid even with certain departures from Bayesian
rationality. For example, respondents might simplify the prediction task by pre-
dicting the vote split in the world that they think is more likely, and ignoring the
possibility of the less likely world. Then, those voting for the correct answer will make
accurate predictions, while those voting for the wrong answer will underestimate the
vote for the correct answer. The average predicted vote for the correct answer will
again underestimate the actual vote, confirming the surprisingly popular principle.
2.3.1 Possible world model
The model extends the biased coin example in two ways. First, we generalize to an
arbitrary number m of possible worlds (each containing a possible coin). One of the
worlds is actual, the rest are counterfactual. We identify worlds with possible answers
to a multiple choice question. Uncertainty about the actual world, i.e., the correct
answer, is modeled by a random variable taking on values in the set {ai, ... , am} of
m possible answers to a multiple-choice question. Second, we distinguish between
a respondent's vote for a particular answer and the evidence on which that vote is
based. The evidence respondent r possesses is summarized by a private 'signal' S',
which is a random variable taking on categorical values in the set {s1 , ... ,sS}. A
respondent's vote V' is given by a function Vr V(S) that maps signals to votes
V'r {v , .... , Vm} for the m possible answers.
Conditional on world ai, signals of different respondents are independent, identi-
cally distributed with probabilities p(sk jai). Therefore, all differences in knowledge
are captured by signals. The prior p(aj) gives probabilities consistent with the evi-
dence that is common knowledge among all respondents. For problem (P) discussed
in the main text, common knowledge might be that Philadelphia is a large city. Ideal
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respondents know the joint distribution p(sk, al), which defines the possible world
model (to avoid degeneracies, we assume p(aj) > 0,p(sk) > 0). However, they do not
know which ai is the correct answer ai., and nor do they know the actual distribution
of received signals. In terms of the coin example, they know which coins are possible
and the properties of each coin, but they do not know which coin is actually being
used.
Respondents have two types of beliefs, both computed from their received signal
Sk and the joint distribution p(sk, ai). Beliefs about the correct answer are given
by the posterior probabilities p(ailsk), which can be obtained from knowledge of the
joint distribution of signals and answers. Beliefs about signals received by other
respondents, say the probability of another respondent receiving signal sj written as
p(Sj sk), are derived by computing the distribution of signals p(sj I a2 ) conditional on
a particular answer being correct, and marginalizing over all possible answers,
P(sjsk) = Z p(sIai)p(asIsk)p(ai)
More explicitly, one would write, p(sqIsr) = Pr(S = s=lSr =s), which is the
probability that another, randomly selected respondent q receives signal sj given that
respondent r has received signal Sk. We omit the supercripts because the probability
is the same for any pair of different respondents q, r.
As discussed in the main text and proven in Theorem 1 below, the probabilities
p(aj Isk) are always inconclusive, in that even an infinite sample of perfectly computed
posterior probabilities over answers is compatible with any given answer being correct
in some possible world model. Posterior probabilities strongly constrain the set of
models with which they are compatible, but they do not identify the actual world.
Theorem 1. The correct answer cannot be deduced by any algorithm relying exclu-
sively on knowledge of actual signal probabilities, p(skjai.), k = 1,... , n and posterior
probabilities over answers implied by these signals, p(arIsk), k = 1,..., n,i = 1,... , m.
Proof. The proof is by construction of a possible world model that generates these
signal probabilities and posterior probabilities for an arbitrarily selected answer.
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Assume that the distribution of signals, p(sklai.), and posterior probabilities,
p(a Isk), are known but the correct answer ai. is unknown. We choose any answer ai,
and construct a corresponding possible world model q(sk, aj) such q would generate
the known signal distribution and posteriors if i* = i.
Observe first that the known parameters do do not constrain the prior over signals,
which we can set equal to:
q(sk) - P(sk ai*) k~s ni -p(aisk ) p(aiIsj)
Because posteriors must match observed posteriors: q(aJisk) = p(ajlsk), for k
1, . .. , n, j = 1, . . . , m, the possible world model is now fixed: q(sk, aj) = q(a3 Isk)q(sk).
In particular, the prior over answers may be computed from the joint distribution,
q(ai, sk) = q(ailsk)q(sk) = P(sklai.)( p(sjai-) 1
by summing over k:
q(ai) = ( p(sj jai.))_,
The marginal distributions q(sk), q(ai), together with the matching posteriors, q(ajIsk)
p(ajIsk), for k = 1, . . . , n, imply that if the correct answer is ai, one would observe
signal distribution p(sklai.):
= q(ai sk)q(sk)q(sk~ai) q~j p(skai*)
q(ai)
Because ai was freely chosen, this proves the theorem. l
Theorem 1 shows that the distribution of posterior probabilities over answers
does not rule out any possible answer as the answer responsible for generating that
distribution.
We turn therefore to the second type of beliefs, about signals received by other
respondents. Because votes are functions of signals, ideal respondents receiving signal
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sk can compute the conditional probability p(vi 8k) that another respondent will vote
for ai. For example, if the voting function instructs respondents to vote for the
most likely answer, V(sj) = arg maxi p(ailsj), to predict the probability that another
respondent votes for ai the respondent receiving signal sk would add the probabilities
of all signals j that are the most favorable to ai:
p(Vilsk) = E p(sjsk) = E p(sjIsg )
j:V(sj)=vi i=arg maxk p(ak s )
Again, this notation suppresses respondent identity. In explict random variable no-
tation, we would write p(vilsk), as p(Vq = V2ISr = sk) for q = r, i.e. the proba-
bility that an arbitrary respondent q votes for vi. This is not to be confused with
p(Vr = ViISr 8 ) which corresponds to stochastic voting by respondent r.
Similarly, we can define the joint distribution of votes (of an arbitrary respondent)
and answers:
p(vi, ak) = p(sj, aj)
j:V(Sj)=Vi
The conditional distributions, p(vilak), and p(aklvi), are likewise well defined for any
voting function.
2.3.2 The two worlds, many signals case m = 2, n > 2
We consider a more general version of the voting rule above, which allows us to avoid
unanimity even when both signals favor the same answer. Specifically, we consider
a cutoff based voting rule that instructs respondents to vote for a1 if the probability
of a, exceeds probability ci, and for a2 if the probability of a2 exceeds c 2  1 - c1 .
Formally, we can express this as
V (sk) = arg max c;i'p(aiIsk)
The above voting rule is identical to the decision algorithm for an ideal observer in
signal detection theory. If c1 = C2 = 0.5, the respondent is assumed to vote for the
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more likely answer.
Theorem 2. Assume that not everyone votes for the correct answer. Then the aver-
age estimate of the votes for the correct answer will be underestimated.
Proof. We first show that actual votes for the correct answer exceed counterfactual
votes for the correct answer, p(vi.jai.) > p(vi.jIak), k f i*, as:
p(vi* Iai*) _ p(ai. vi.)p(ak) _ p(ai* Ivi*) (1 - p(ai))
p(vi*|ak) p(akjvi*)p(ai*) ~ (1 - p(aiIvi.)) p(ai)
The fraction on the right is well defined as 0 < p(ai* vi.) < 1; it is greater than one
if and only if p(ai.Ivi.) > p(ai*Ivi.)p(vi.) + p(ai. vk)p(vk) = p(ai.), as p(ai.Ivi*) >
ci., p(ai. Ivk) < ci. by definition of the criterion based voting function.
A respondent with signal sj computes expected votes by marginalizing across the
two possible worlds, p(vi. Is) = p(vi.jai*)p(ai. Is) +p(vi. Iak)p(akIsj). The actual vote
for the correct answer is no less than the counterfactual vote, p(vi-jIai*) ;> p(vi*ak).
Therefore, p(vi*sj) < p(vi. jai*), with strict inequality unless p(ai.*Is) = 1. Because
weak inequality holds for all signals, and is strict for some, the average predicted vote
will be strictly underestimated. E
If there are more than two possible answers m > 2, the actual proportion of votes
for the correct answer exceeds predictions provided that votes are defined by a cutoff
vector E ci = 1. However, it no longer points to a unique correct answer, as more
than one answer may be underestimated.
2.3.3 Applying the surprisingly popular algorithm to binary
questions
Theorem 2 shows that the average prediction of votes for the correct answer will
underestimate the actual frequency of votes for the correct answer, or, in other words,
the correct answer will be more popular than predicted. Applying this theorem to
actual data is straightforward. Two quantities are elicited from each respondent: (1)
which of the two options they personally vote for, (2) what fraction of the sample
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they predict will vote for each option. The fraction of respondents voting for each
option gives the actual vote frequency. The arithmetic mean of the predictions of
all respondents gives the average vote prediction for each option. The surprisingly
popular algorithm selects the answer that has an actual vote frequency that exceeds
its predicted vote frequency.
2.3.4 The case m = n > 2
Our results for the general case with more than two answers and the same number
of signals and answers, rely on a Lemma that shows how the ratio of posterior prob-
abilities on the correct answer relative to any other answer can be derived from the
signal frequencies, and their pairwise conditional probabilities. The Lemma is impor-
tant because it expresses terms whose estimate requires knowing the correct answer
(posterior probabilities on truth) as functions of terms that do not require knowledge
of the correct answer.
Lemma. Consider a possible world model with m answers and n signals and joint
probability distribution p(sj, at). Let ai. denote the correct answer. Then:
p(ai.|sk) Oc p(skIai.) > S Sk)
p(sk sj )
(setting 0/0 = 0).
Proof. From Bayes' rule, we have,
p(Si ) p (Sj k)
P(skIsi)




Invoking Bayes' rule again,
p(aij*|sk) = P(ska) p(ai) = p(skjai.) P(SiISk) p(ai.)
p(sk) p(sk si)
Because p(ai.) is constant across all k, the Lemma follows. E
The Lemma shows how the distribution of signals, and the pairwise predictions of
signals, can identify the answer given by respondents who are best informed, in the
sense of assigning the highest probability on the correct answer. These respondents
would be least surprised by the correct answer, were it revealed.
To convert this Lemma into an algorithm for selecting the correct answer we need
to assume that for each answer there is a unique signal such that respondents with that
signal assign most probability to this answer, which is also more than the probability
assigned to it by other respondents. This assumption is violated, for example, with
the posteriors below:
.4 .3 .3
p(ailsk)= .45 .55 0
.2 .3 .5
If the correct answer is a, (first column), then respondents with S2 (second row)
would be least surprised, yet they would believe that the most likely correct answer
is a2 . A selection principle based on treating as correct the answer selected by these
respondents would incorrectly choose a2 . The theorem below rules out this possibility,
by requiring that respondents voting for a given answer assign assign more probability
to it than do respondents voting for other answers.
Theorem 3. Assume m = n, V(si) = vi, and p(ailsi) > p(ailsj). Let ai. denote the
correct answer. Define the prediction-normalized vote for ak, V(k), as
V(k) = p(vVkaj*) P(v Isk)
(setting 0/0 = 0). Then the correct answer has the highest prediction-normalized
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votes.
Proof. Applying the Lemma, we have,
p(ai Isk) OC p(skIa*) p(Silsk)
P(sklsi)
Because V(si) = vi, we can rewrite this as:
p(ai.Isk) oc p(vIai*) I = V(k)
p(ai. si-) > p(a* I sk) by the assumption that respondents who vote for a given answer
(including ai.) assign greater posterior probability to it than respondents voting for
any other answer ak. Therefore V(i*) > V(k), proving that the correct answer ai.
has the highest prediction-normalized vote. E
One could apply Theorem 3 to experimental data using the following estimation
procedure. Because ai. matches the actual world, the frequency of votes for answer
ak provides an estimate for p(vkIai.), which is exact in the limit of an infinite number
of respondents. The probabilities p(vklsi) are estimated by asking respondents to
predict the frequency of votes Vk and then averaging the predictions of those who
voted vi.
2.3.5 The case m, n > 2
It is possible to extend our approach to the general setting of m worlds, and n signals,
provided one also elicits respondents' posterior distribution over possible answers.
Here we simply indicate the main idea, and for convenience consider m > 2, n = 2.
That is, we have many coins, each with exactly two sides. Each individual thus has
a small amount of information bearing on the many possible answers.
The bias of coin i is given by the ratio on the left side of the Bayesian identity
below,
p(si|ai) p(ajlsi) p(s1 s2 ) 1 n
p(s2Iaj) p(ails2) p(s 2 Isi)
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The analyst does not know these true coin biases, but can estimate them from the
terms on the right, which respondents provide as their posterior probabilities, p(a Isi),
p(ails 2), and pairwise predictions, p(sijs 2 ), p(s2 |si). The data therefore can be used
to assign the correct bias to each possible coin.
To find the actual coin, the analyst asks respondents to report their toss outcome.
The frequencies of observed tosses will converge to p(s|Iai.) and p(s 2lai.). The actual
coin is then revealed as the coin whose assigned bias matches the observed one:
p(ailsi)p(sils2 ) _ p(silai*)
p(ails2)p(s 2Isi) p(s 2 1ai-)
A concrete example illustrates this. Assume three coins, a priori equally likely:
(A) 2 : 1 biased for Heads, (B) 2 : 1 biased for Tails, (C) unbiased. From Bayes' rule
respondents derive posterior probabilities over A,B,C as (1, q, }) following Heads, and
(), j, }) following tails. By symmetry of the assumptions, their predictions are also
symmetric p(sIsk) = p(saIsk ).
Let us assume the actual coin is C. Respondents report their toss, their posterior
probabilities on A, B, C, and their predicted toss distribution. From the predictions
and posteriors the analyst assigns correct biases to the three possible coins, and notes
that coin C is unbiased. Because toss reports converge to an even split between Heads
and Tails, he deduces that the actual coin must be C.
The same method works in the general case, with more than two signals. It is
important, however, that the elicitation separates signals (e.g., Heads vs. Tails) and
possible states of the world (e.g., A, B, C). Respondents report signals, predict signals,
and assign posteriors to states of the world.
2.4 Empirical tests of aggregation algorithms
2.4.1 Study descriptions
To test selecting the surprisingly popular answer (SP), we conducted studies with
four types of semantic and perceptual content (details in Section 2.9). Studies la,b,c
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used 50 U.S. state capitals questions, repeating the format (P) with different popula-
tions. Study 2 employed 80 general knowledge questions. Study 3 asked professional
dermatologists to diagnose 80 skin lesion images as benign or malignant. Studies 4a,b
presented 90 20th century artworks to laypeople and art professionals, and asked them
to predict the correct market price category. All studies included a dichotomous vot-
ing question, yielding 490 items in total. Studies 1c, 2, and 3 additionally measured
confidence. Predicted vote frequencies were computed by averaging all respondents'
predictions.
2.4.2 Classification accuracy of aggregation methods
We first test pairwise accuracies of four algorithms: majority vote, SP, confidence
weighted vote, and max-confidence, which selects the answer endorsed with highest
average confidence. Across all 490 items, the SP algorithm reduced errors by 21.3%
relative to simple majority vote (p < 0.0005 by two-sided matched-pair sign test).
Across the 210 items on which confidence was measured, the reduction was 30.8%
relative to majority vote (p < 0.001), 21.1% relative to confidence weighted vote
(p = 0.0107), and 22.2% relative to max-confidence (p = 0.0722).
When frequencies of different correct answers are imbalanced, percentage agree-
ment can be high by chance. Therefore we assess classification accuracy by categorical
correlation coefficients, such as Cohen's kappa, Fl-score, or Matthew's correlation.
The SP algorithm has the highest kappa in every study (Figure 2-3); other coefficients
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Figure 2-3: Results of aggregation algorithms on studies discussed in the text. N
(items per study) = 50 (Studies labc), N = 80 (Studies 2 and 3), N = 90 (Studies
4ab). Agreement with truth is measured by Cohen's kappa, with error bars showing
standard errors. kappa = (A - B)/(1 - B), where A is percent correct decisions
across items in a study, and B the probability of a chance correct decision, computed
-according to answer percentages generated by the algorithm. Confidence was not
elicited in Studies lab, 4ab. However, in 4ab we use scale values as proxy for confi-
dence (Lebreton et al., 2015), giving extreme categories (on a four point scale) twice
as much weight in scale-weighted voting, and 100% weight in max-scale. The results
for Individual are average kappa-s across all individuals. SP is consistently the best
performer across all studies. Results using Matthews correlation coefficient, Fl-score,
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Figure 2-4: Performance of all methods across all studies, shown with respect to
the Matthews correlation coefficient. Error bars are bootstrapped standard errors.
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Figure 2-5: Performance of all methods across all studies, shown with respect to the
macro-averaged Fl-score. Error bars are bootstrapped standard errors. Details of
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Performance of all methods across all studies, shown with respect to
percentage of questions correct. Error bars are bootstrapped standard errors. Details







2.4.3 Art study results - preventing unwise crowds
The art domain, for which majority opinion is too conservative, provides insight into
how SP works. Art professionals and laypeople estimated the price of 90 artworks by
selecting one of four bins: < $1, 000; $1, 000 - $30, 000; $30, 000 - $1, 000, 000; and
> $1, 000, 000. Respondents also predicted the binary division of their sample's votes
relative to $30,000.
Both professionals and laypeople strongly favored the lower two bins, with pro-
fessionals better able to discriminate value (Figure 2-7). The preference for low price
is not necessarily an error: Asked to price an unfamiliar artwork, individuals may
rely on their beliefs about market prices, and assume that expensive (> $30, 000)
pieces are rare. This shared knowledge creates a bias when votes are counted, be-
cause similar, hence redundant, base rate information is factored in repeatedly, once
for each respondent. Indeed, Figure 2-7 shows that the majority verdict is strongly
biased against the high category. For example, facing a $100K artwork, the average
professional has a 30% chance of making the correct call, while the majority vote of
the professional panel is directionally correct only 10% of the time. It is difficult for
any expensive artwork to be recognized as such by a majority. The SP algorithm
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Figure 2-7: Logistic regressions showing the probability that an artwork is judged
expensive (above $30K) as function of log actual market price. Thin purple lines are
individual respondents in the art professionals and laypeople samples, and the yellow
line shows the average respondent. Price discrimination is given by the slope of the
logistic lines, which is significantly different from zero for 14/20 respondents in the
professional sample, and 5/20 respondents in the laypeople sample (Chi-squared, p <
0.05). Performance is unbiased if a line passes through the red diamond, indicating
that an artwork with true value of exactly $30K has a 50-50 chance of being judged
above or below $30K. The bias against the higher price category, which characterizes
most individuals, is amplified when votes are aggregated into majority opinion (blue
line). The surprisingly popular algorithm (green line) eliminates the bias, and matches
the discrimination of the best individuals in each sample.
2.4.4 Results on propositional knowledge
The two studies on propositional knowledge yielded different results (Figure 2-3).
On capitals (Studies labe), SP reduced the number of incorrect decisions by 48% on
capitals relative to majority vote. SP was less effective on the knowledge questions in
Study 2 (14% error reduction, p = .031, two-sided matched-pair sign test). This is the
only study that used the Amazon Mechanical Turk respondent pool. In contrast to
other studies, the predicted vote splits in Study 2 were within 10% of 50% for 81% of
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Art professionals Art laypeople
items, compared to 22% of such items across other studies. This limited opportunities
for SP to alter majority vote.
2.4.5 States capitals results - Consensus and systematic error
The simulation results in the next section predict that voting accuracies track consen-
sus while the accuracy of surprisingly popular answers is independent of consensus.
and so to illustrate this point we show the accuracy of three different aggregation
methods as a function of consensus on Study la,b,c in Figure 2-8. Furthermore, be-
cause the states capitals studies were run three times we can use this to investigate
the extent to which selecting the surprisingly popular answer and voting differ at
sytematically obtaining the wrong answer for particular questions. (Confidences were
only elicited in Study 1c, and so this analysis does not include confidence-weighted
voting.) Figure 2-8 includes histograms for voting and selecting the surprisingly pop-
ular answer showing for how many of the fifty states the method was correct for the 0,
1, 2, or 3 times the study was run. As these histograms show, there are a number of
states for which voting is systemtically wrong every time the study was run, but this
is not the case for selecting the suprisingly popular answer - the surprisingly popular
answer gets a few states incorrect each time the study is run, but it is not the same







Study 1 00 '




20 10 20 30
0.0
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0
Consensus








0.5 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0
Consensus
C Surprisingly popular answer1.0
81






0.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Consensus
Figure 2-8: Logistic curves (with 95% confidence intervals) show the accuracy of the
methods as a function of consensus, treating the Study la,b,c results described in the
text as providing 150 questions. Histograms show the number of states for which the
answer was correctly determined (using voting and the surprisingly popular answer)
for none, one, two, or all of the experiments. Confidence-weighted voting could only
be applied to one study, and so does not include a histogram.
2.5 Simulations for finite samples
Our theoretical results that justify selecting the surprisingly popular answer all de-
pend on the assumption of an infinite sample of Bayesian respondents. To investigate
the performance of our new method, as well as standard aggregation mechanisms, on
finite samples of Bayesian respondents we turn to numerical simulation.
2.5.1 Sampling assumptions
The simulations were based on the biased coin model (Figure 2-2). The world prior,
coin biases, the actual world, and respondent coin flips were randomly generated to
produce simulated finite samples of votes, confidences, and vote predictions (Figure
2-9).
We performed numerical simulations for the simplest m = n = 2 case, under a
uniform sampling assumption. We randomly sampled 1000 datasets each with 50
questions, answered by up to 1000 respondents. For each dataset, respondent subsets
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of size N E {6, 12, 33, 10001 were randomly sampled. For each question w = 1, 2,....
a possible world model consisting of a joint distribution of two world states and
two signals p(sW', aF) was uniformly sampled, with resampling if it did not satisfy
p(awIsw) > 0.5. An actual world a* was sampled given p(aw), and signals were
sampled given p(sg'aw). Votes, confidences, and vote predictions were computed for
each ideal Bayesian respondent.
2.5.2 Simulation results
Under these sampling assumptions, individuals are correct 75% of the time. Applying
majority voting gives an accuracy of 86%. This 11% improvement is the standard
wisdom-of-the-crowd effect. SP is almost infallible for large samples, and it shows
good, though not perfect, performance even on small sample sizes. However, given
the 86% accuracy of majority vote, SP may need many problems to demonstrate a
statistically significant advantage. For example, with 50 problems and n = 30, the
SP superiority attains p < .05 for only 40% of simulated studies. 1
2.6 Analysis of predictions of the votes of others
Our model describes how Bayesian respondents formulate a prediction of the vote dis-
tribution of others based on their received signal. Here, we describe some descriptive
statistics of the predictions of votes. Respondents' votes were, in general, correlated
with their own answers, which is one reason that vote predictions tend not to be sim-
ply 50%-50% . That is, respondents voting for option A, compared to those voting
for option B, put higher probability on other respondents also voting for option A. In
other words, respondents demonstrated self-projection or false consensus (Ross et al.,
'We sampled 1000 synthetic datasets each consisting of 50 questions and answered by 30 re-
spondents. We computed the answer given by majority vote and the surprisingly popular answer
and for each dataset performed a paired-samples t-test of voting correctness against the correctness
of the surprisingly popular answer. For 392 of the sampled datasets, the test showed a significant
advantage (p < 0.05) of the surprisingly popular answer over majority voting, and for none of the
sampled datasets was there a significant advantage of majority voting over the surprisingly popular
answer.
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Figure 2-9: Performance of aggregation methods on simulated datasets of binary
questions, under uniform sampling assumptions. A pair of coin biases (i.e. signal
distribution parameters), and a prior over worlds are sampled, each from independent
uniform distributions. Combinations of coin biases and prior that result in recipients
of both coin tosses voting for the same answer are discarded. An actual coin is
sampled according to the prior, and tossed a finite number of times to produce the
votes, confidences, and vote predictions required by the different methods (see Section
2.5.1 for simulation details). As well as showing how sample size affects different
aggregation methods the simulations also show that majorities become more reliable
as consensus increases. A majority of 90% is correct about 90% of the time, while a
majority of 55% is not much better than chance. This is not due to sampling error,
but reflects the structure of the model and simulation assumptions. According to the
model, an answer with x% endorsements is incorrect if counterfactual endorsements
for that answer exceed x% (Theorem 2), and the chance of sampling such a problem
diminishes with x.
1977). As Dawes originally argued (Dawes, 1989, 1990), such a false-consensus effect
need not be irrational and can be entirely consistent with Bayesian reasoning. The
idea is that respondents own beliefs act as an 'informative sample of one' and thus
give them information about the distribution of beliefs in the population. Hence, not
only is the existence of the false-consensus effect not an argument against selecting
the surprisingly popular answer, it is actually predicted by the possible world model.
Across the three capitals studies (la,b,c), respondents voting for False predicted that
49% of respondents would endorse True, whereas those voting for True predicted
that 73% would. For the trivia questions in Study 2, this prediction was 45% and
59%, respectively. In the lesion study, respondents who voted for benign predicted
that 34% of respondents would vote for malignant, but those voting for malignant
predicted 79%. In the art study with MIT students, those voting for the expensive
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price bin predicted that 46% of other would, whereas those voting for cheap predicted
that only 22% would vote for expensive. For the study with art professionals, these
predictions were 53% and 14%, respectively.
For each study, we can examine how often respondents gave predictions that were
close to a uniform split. For studies where predictions were given as percentages, we
count the fraction of times that a vote prediction is given that is within 10% of 50-50,
i.e. the prediction of votes for the first option is between 40% and 60%. Across the
three states studies, an average of 36% of predictions were within 10% of 50-50, in
the trivia study 56%, in the art MIT study 29%, and in the art professionals study
19%. For the lesions study, respondents gave their predictions on an 11 point scale,
and 30% of predictions were one of the three middle bins. Note that if all respondents
simply predict that 50% of the sample will endorse each of two possible answers, then
the surprisingly popular answer is the same as that obtained by majority vote.
As a further description of the predictions that people made, we compare predic-
tions of the perecentage of people voting True (or malignant) to the probability that
people put on the answer being True (or malignant), inferred from their vote and
confidence. For the MIT states study where confidence was elected this correlation is
rs = 0.64, (p < 0.001), for the lesions study r, = 0.87, (p < 0.001), and for the trivia
study rs = 0.48, (p < 0.001).
While false consensus or social projection has been extensively studied in so-
cial psychology, the phenomena of false-uniqueness whereby respondents insufficiently
weight their own answers is much less studied (Chambers, 2008; Suls and Wan, 1987).
There are a number of approaches to detect false-uniqueness. We regress for each re-
spondent individually, across all of the questions that they answer, the actual fraction
of people endorsing a given answer for each question against the respondent's predic-
tion of the fraction of people endorsing that answer together with the respondent's
own answer. We can then test, for each respondent, whether the coefficient on their
own answer is significant. That is, we can assess whether there is information in a
respondent's own answer about the fraction of people endorsing an answer, that is
not captured in the respondent's predictions. As a result of this analysis, we find
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that there are indeed respondents participating in our studies that exhibit such false-
uniqueness, in the range of 50% to 75% of respondents depending on the study. Unlike
the false-consensus effect, false-uniqueness is not predicted by a model of Bayesian
respondents, but the argument for selecting the surprisingly popular answer is robust
to the existence of respondents who display false-uniqueness since even if a respondent
combines their prior and likelihood but puts too much weight on their prior belief
about which world is likely and too little weight on their signal, their prediction will
still fall between the belief distribution in each counterfactual world.
We do not have sufficient experimental evidence to justify a particular method
of eliciting useful vote predictions, but we offer a few suggestions, and speculations
for future testing. Vote predictions can be incentivized for accuracy. For example,
respondents can be paid a bonus which depends on the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between their prediction and the actual distribution, or incentivized more generally
using the Bayesian Truth Serum (Prelec, 2004). Respondents can be explicitly en-
couraged to consider whether they are in the minority or majority, and what opinions
people different to themselves may hold. Instructions may help respondents recognize
cases where despite them having high confidence in an answer, they should also be-
lieve that only a minority of respondents would vote for this answer. It is possible that
choosing to not elicit confidence prior to eliciting predictions may help respondents
to avoid conflating these two quantities. When dealing with respondents answering
multiple questions who give identical vote predictions for every question, one could
take steps to encourage them to reflect on whether this is an accurate reflection of
their beliefs. Respondents could be given information about the composition of the
sample that they are in, to aid them in making good predictions about the answers
of others.
2.7 Discussion
SP performance will always be limited by the information available to the respondent
sample, and the competence of respondents. If the available evidence is incomplete
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or misleading, the answer that best fits the evidence may be incorrect. This qualifier
can be made explicit by careful phrasing of questions. A question like "Will global
temperature increase by more than 5%?" could be worded as: "Given current ev-
idence, is it more likely or not that global temperature will increase by more than
5%?"
The SP algorithm is robust to some deviations from ideal responding. The out-
come will not change, for example, if respondents simply predict the vote frequency
consistent with the world they believe most likely, instead of computing confidences
and interpolating predictions. Similarly, the surprisingly popular answer is robust
to respondents who give a prediction obtained from mixing the vote frequencies in
each world according to the prior over worlds rather than their posterior distribution
over worlds. Even if some respondents find the prediction task too difficult, they
may simply predict the default value of 50-50. This would bring SP results closer to
majority opinion.
While selecting the surprisingly popular answer is robust to some of the biases
that people's predictions may exhibit, such as false-uniqueness effects, there are other
psychological biases that could decrease the accuracy of selecting the surprisingly
popular answer if they were prevalent in a sample of respondents. In particular, if
respondents who gave the correct answer were in a minority but exhibited strong
curse of knowledge effects (Nickerson, 2001; Keysar et al., 1995; Nickerson, 1999;
Hinds, 1999; Kennedy, 1995; Camerer et al., 1989) or 'truly false consensus effects'
(Krueger and Clement, 1994) and incorrectly believed that most other people also
knew the correct answer, then the surprisingly popular answer could be incorrect.
A different kind of objection to selecting the surprisingly popular answer one might
call the 'crazy, secret sect objection'. Suppose that there is a secret sect whose leader
has told the members that the world will end tomorrow. If everyone in the world
was then surveyed about whether the world would end tomorrow, would selecting
the surprisingly popular answer incorrectly conclude that the world would end to-
morrow? 2 It is possible that people may have sensible beliefs about the prevalence
2 Since the members of the sect will vote that the world will end tomorrow and this would not be
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of crazy sects in that they think there is always some small number, but believe that
there are more when the world is actually ending, but suppose they underestimate
the frequency of such beliefs in this case. Which assumptions of our model have been
violated? Sometimes selecting the surprisingly popular answer will select the answer
given by a group of people with extra information, but such extra information may
be incorrect, and point in the wrong direction. Alternatively, the problem may be
that the possible world model makes the assumption that people share knowledge of
the joint distribution of signals and states of the world, but this may be inaccurate,
for example when there is a crazy sect receiving a signal that other people do not put
the correct probability on being received or when people inside and outside the sect
have a different prior probability over world states.
Ultimately, one would like to apply our method to potentially controversial prob-
lems, like political and environmental forecasts, where it is important to guard against
manipulation. For example, respondents might try to increase the chance that their
favored option wins by strategically submitting low vote predictions for that option.
When this is a concern, one can impose truth telling incentives using the Bayesian
truth serum (John et al., 2012; Prelec, 2004). This mechanism also requires vote
predictions and rewards respondents for answers that are revealed to be surprisingly
popular. Here, we have shown that the same criterion selects the best collective
answer.
The SP algorithm can be compared to a prediction market, which also aggregates
opinions on single questions (Arrow et al., 2008). Both methods allow experts to
override the majority view, and both associate expertise with choosing alternatives
whose popularity exceeds current expectations. However, unlike prediction markets,
our method accepts non-verifiable propositions, such as counterfactual conjectures
in public policy, history or law. This, together with the simple input requirements,
greatly expands its application range.
predicted by everyone else, implying that their answer is surprisingly popular.
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2.8 Conclusion
Although democratic methods of opinion aggregation have been influential and pro-
ductive, they have underestimated collective intelligence in one respect. People are
not limited to stating their actual beliefs; they can also reason about beliefs that
would arise under hypothetical scenarios. Such knowledge can be exploited to re-
cover truth even when traditional voting methods fail. If respondents have enough
evidence to establish the correct answer, then the surprisingly popular principle will
yield that answer; more generally, it will produce the best answer in light of available
evidence. These claims are theoretical and do not guarantee success in practice, as ac-
tual respondents will fall short of ideal. However, it would be hard to trust a method
if it fails with ideal respondents on simple problems like (P). To our knowledge, the
method proposed here is the only one that passes this test.
2.9 Appendix - Methods
2.9.1 Informed consent
All studies were approved by the M.I.T. Committee on the use of humans as exper-
imental subjects (COUHES). For all studies, informed consent was obtained from
respondents using text approved by COUHES. For in-person studies, respondents
signed a consent form and for online studies, respondents checked a box.
2.9.2 Studies la, b - State capitals
Materials and methods
The survey instrument consisted of the following single sheet of paper (shown in
Figure 2-10), which respondents were asked to complete. There was no time limit.
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Your CODE
For each statement, please answer whether you think it is True (T) or False (F)





Birmingham Is the capital of Alabama.
Anchorage is the capital of Alaska. _
Phoenix is the capital of Arizona.
Little Rock is the capital of Arkansas.
Los Angeles is the capital of California. _
Denver Is the capital of Colorado.
Bridgeport is the capital of Connecticut
Wilmington Is the capital of Delaware.
Jacksonville is the capital of Florida.
Atlanta is the capital of Georgia. -
Honolulu Is the capital of Hawall.
Boise is the capital of Idaho.
Chicago Is the capital of Illinois.
Indianapolis Is the capital of Indiana. ____
Des Moines is the capital of lowa.
Wichita is the capital of Kansas.
Lexington is the capital of Kentucky. -
New Orleans is the capital of Louisiana. _
Portland is the capital of Maine, ___
Baltimore is the capital of Maryland. -
Boston is the capital of Massachusetts.
Detroit is the capital of Michigan. ____
Minneapolis Is the capital of Minnesota. -
Jackson is the capital of Mississippi. -


























Billings is the capital of Montana
Omaha is the capital of Nebraska.
Las Vegas is the capital of Nevada.
Manchester is the capital of New Hampshire.
Newark Is the capital of New Jersey. -
Albuquerque is the capital of New Mexico. 
_
New York City is the capital of New York. _
Charlotte is the capital of North Carolina.
Fargo is the capital of North Dakota.
Columbus is the capital or Ohio.
Oklahoma City is the capital of Oklahoma.
Portland is the capital of Oregon. _
Philadelphia is the capital of Pennsylvania. -
Providence Is the capital of Rhode Island. _
Columbia is the capital of South Carolina.
Sioux Falls Is the capital of South Dakota.
Memphis is the capital of Tennessee.
Houston Is the capital of Texas.
Salt Lake City is the capital of Utah. _
Burlington Is the capital of Vermont
Virginia Beach is the capital of Virginia. -
Seattle is the capital of Washington. -
Charleston is the capital of West Virginia. -
Milwaukee is the capital of Wisconsin.
Cheyenne is the capital of Wyoming.
Figure 2-10: Survey instrument for Study la,b
Respondents and procedure
Study la was conducted in the context of two MIT, Sloan MBA classes. 51 re-
spondents were asked to mark their answer sheet by a personal code, and were
promised feedback about the results, but no other compensation. Study lb was
conducted at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS,
http://pless.princeton.edu/). 32 respondents were drawn from the pool of pre-registered
volunteers in the PLESS database, which is restricted to Princeton students (under-
graduate and graduate). Respondents received a flat $15 participation fee. In addi-
tion, the two respondents with the most accurate answers received a $15 bonus, as
did the two respondents with the most accurate percentage predictions. (In fact, one
respondent received both bonuses, earning $45 in total). Respondents marked their
sheet by a pre-assigned code, known only to the PLESS administrator who distributed




















2.9.3 Study ic - State capitals
Materials and methods
The survey was administered on a computer, and a screenshot from the experiment
is shown in Figure 2-11.
Figure 2-11: Screenshot of question from Study 1c.
Respondents and procedure
The study was conducted in the MIT Behavioral Research Lab (http://web.mit.edu/brl/).
33 respondents were recruited from the MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences Depart-
ment experimental respondents mailing list, with participation restricted to members
of the MIT community. Respondents received a $15 participation fee. In addition, the
top 20% of respondents with the most accurate answers with respect to ground truth
and the top 20% of respondents with the most accurate predictions about the beliefs
of others earned a $25 bonus. Respondents were eligible to receive both bonuses. The
explanation given to respondents about the bonus system is reproduced below.
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Determination of bonus:
After the study is complete, we will calculate two accuracy scores for each respondent.
(1). Your objective accuracy score is based on your answers to (a) and (b).
For each statement we calculate the probability that you think the statement is true
and use this, together with whether the statement is actually true to calculate your
score. We use the Brier scoring function, which is designed so that your score is
maximized when you report your true guess and confidence level. Below is a table
which helps you understand the score you would receive, depending on whether your
answer in (a) was correct or incorrect. The table gives the score at intervals of ten
percentage points, but you can choose any percentage between 50% and 100%.









" the more certain you claim to be, the more points you can win
" as you approach 100%, the penalty for being incorrect climbs much faster than
the gains for being correct.
A tip:
o In the long run, you will score the most points if the numbers correspond to
your true levels of confidence. Expressing too much confidence is a common
mistake in this game.
(2). Your prediction accuracy score is based on your answers to (c) and (d).
Your prediction accuracy score reflects how well you have predicted the actual per-
centages of respondents who answered Yes to each of the fifty questions, and how
well you have estimated the average confidence levels.
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2.9.4 Study 2 - General knowledge questions
Materials and Methods
The survey consisted of 80 trivia questions in the domains of history, language, sci-
ence, and geography. The survey was administered as an online questionnaire and
question order was randomized across respondents. The questions were a subset of the
150 questions from the True/False quizzes in these domains on the quiz site Sporcle
(www.sporcle.com). Two online pilot experiments (of 70 and 80 questions each) were
conducted in which respondents were only asked whether they thought the answer
to each question was True or False, i.e respondents were not asked to make second-
order predictions. Using the results of the two pilot experiments, 80 questions were
selected by matching the questions for percentage correct, e.g. a question that 30%
of respondents answered correctly was matched with a question that 70% of respon-
dents answered correctly. This resulted in a balanced final survey with respect to the
number of questions the majority answered correct as well as the number of questions
for which the correct answer was false, as shown by the contingency table in Table
2.1.
Actual answer is false Actual answer is true [Totals
Majority incorrect 20 19 39
Majority tie 1 1 2
Majority correct 19 20 39
40 40 80
Table 2.1: Contingency table showing distribution of questions for Study 2.
Example questions, together with the percentage of respondents who answered
correctly in the pilot experiment are shown in Table 2.2.
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Example question Percent of
respondents correct in
pilot experiments
Japan has the world's highest life expectancy 10
The Nile River is more than double the length of the Volga 20
Portuguese is the official language of Mozambique 30
Avogadro's constant is greater than Planck's constant 40
The currency of Switzerland is the Euro 50
Abkhazia is a disputed territory in Georgia. 50
The chemical symbol for Tin is Sn 60
The Iron Age comes after the Bronze Age 70
Schuyler Colfax was Abraham Lincoln's Vice President 80
The longest bone in the human body is the femur 90
Table 2.2: Example questions from Study 2 and percent correct in pilot experiments.
Respondents were given the following instructions:
Please read the following 80 True/False trivia questions carefully and make your best
guess.
For each question, we'll ask you to do three things:
(a) Say whether you think the statement is more likely True or False
(b) Think about your own beliefs and estimate the probability that your answer is
correct
(c) Think about other people's beliefs and predict the percentage of people who
guessed the answer was 'True'
To give an estimate of the probability that their answer was correct, respondents
chose one of the six following options:
(a) Totally uncertain, a coin toss (about 50% chance of being correct)
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(b) A little confident (about 60% chance of being correct)
(c) Somewhat confident (about 70% chance of being correct)
(d) High confidence (about 80% chance of being correct)
(e) Very high confidence (about 90% chance of being correct)
(f) Certain (about 100% chance of being correct)
To answer the second-order prediction, people gave a percentage.
Respondents were asked to not search for the answers to the questions. Respon-
dents searching for the answer, rather than answering from their own knowledge,
does not make affect testing the aggregation method since this is simply an addi-
tional source of information for some respondents who may thus be more accurate.
The average time to complete all three parts of a question was 17 seconds and it was
not the case that if a respondent took more time to answer a question they were more
likely to be correct, suggesting that, in fact, searching for the correct answer was not
common.
Respondents and Procedure
Respondents were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid a flat fee of
$5.00 with 39 respondents completing the survey. Respondents who took part in either
of the pilot experiments were excluded from participating in the final experiment.
2.9.5 Study 3 - Dermatologists assessing lesions
Materials and Methods
The survey was administered online. Respondents were divided into two groups, with
one survey containing images of 40 benign and 20 malignant lesions, and the other
survey containing images of 20 benign and 40 malignant lesions. The 80 images used
in the experiment were obtained from Atlas Dermatologico, DermIS, and DermQuest.
The images were selected to be approximately the same size, had no visible signs of
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biopsy, and were filtered for quality by an expert dermatologist. Question order was
randomized across respondents. Since all lesions pictured in the survey had been
biopsied, whether a particular lesion was benign or malignant was known to us.
For each image of a lesion, respondents predicted whether the lesions was benign or
malignant, gave their confidence on a six point Likert scale from 'absolutely uncertain'
to 'absolutely certain' and estimated the likely distribution of opinions amongst other
dermatologists on an eleven point scale from 'perfect agreement that it is benign' to
'perfect agreement that it is malignant' with the midpoint labeled as 'split in opinions
with equal number of benign and malignant diagnoses'.
Respondents and procedure
Dermatologists were recruited by referral and 25 respondents answered the survey,
with 12 in the condition with 40 benign lesions and 13 in the condition with 20 benign
lesions. Respondents had an average of 10.5 years of experience. Respondents were
told that a $25 donation would be made to support young investigators in dermatology
for every completed survey, and that if the survey was completed by a particular date
this would be increased to $50. Respondents were also told that a randomly selected
respondent would receive $1000.
2.9.6 Study 4a, b - Professionals and laypeople judging art
Materials and Methods
The survey instrument consisted of a bound booklet with each page containing a
color picture of a 20th century art piece and questions about the piece. The medium
and dimensions were given for each piece. Participants were given the following
instructions:
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The survey contains 90 reproductions of modern (20th century) artworks. For each
artwork we will aks you a few questions.
Your answers will help us understand how professionals and non-professionals re-
spond to modern art.
" By professionals, we have in mind people working with art, in galleries or
museums.
" By non-professionals, we are referring to MIT master's and doctoral students
who have not taken any formal art or art history classes.
We are also interested in how well people can predict the responses of other people.
So, some questions will ask you to guess how other people will respond.
This will be explained more fully on the next page. If there is anything unclear about
our instructions please do not hesitate to ask!
We reproduce the page of the booklet containing the instructions and an example
question page in Figures 2-12 and 2-13.
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On Ihe next pages you will see a series of artwork images. For each, we would like you
to do four things:
TFirst. we would like you to provide a simple personal response to the artwork by
circling one of the two icons below-
(W Then we would like you to guess how other respondents to this survey - art
professionals and MIT students - will respond to ®. Specificaiy. we would like you to
estimate the percentage of each group that wiN circle 4:
Estimated % of professionals circling & %
Estimated % of MIT students circling qb %
QV Third, we would like you to predict the current market vWtye of the artwork on the
page by checking one of the following 4 value categories:
under $1,000 $1,000 $30,000 over $1.000,000
to to
$30,000 $1,000,000
W Finally, we would like you to guess how others will respond to ®. Thus, we would
like you to estimate the percentage of art professionals and MIT students who wilpredict a market value above $30,000 (one of top 2 boxes).
Estimated % of professionals predicting value above $30,000: %
Estimated % of MIT students predicting value above $30,000: %
Figure 2-12: Page of booklet containing instructions for Study 4a,b.
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"Acykic Painting / 11 x 7 x ." (27.9 x 17.8 x 2 5 cm)
4 Your response:
Estimated % of professionals circling % %
Estimated % of MIT students circling % %
under $1,000 $1,000 $30.000 over $1,000,000
to to$30,000 $1.000.000
Estimated % of professionals predicting value above $30,000: %
Estimated % of MIT students pedicting value above $30,000. %
Figure 2-13: Example page of booklet given to respondents in Study 4.
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Respondents and Procedure
Two groups of respondents completed the survey. The MIT group consisted of twenty
MIT graduate students who had not taken courses in art or in art history. They were
paid $20 as compensation for their time. Respondents came individually into the
lab, and completed the survey in a room alone. The Newbury group, named for
Newbury street in Boston which has many art galleries, consisted of art professionals
- predominantly managers of art galleries. The art professionals were visited by
appointment at their offices and completed the survey during the appointment.
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Chapter 3
A Bayesian hierarchical model for
aggregating opinions by using
predictions about the beliefs of others
This chapter mostly consists of material from a working paper with the same title
that is joint work with Drazen Prelec.
Introduction
We begin this chapter by recalling that majority or confidence-weighted voting may
lead to the wrong answer. To illustrate this, imagine that a committe is voting
on two alternative launch strategies for a new product. Suppose that the default
strategy appears superior on most dimensions, but has a subtle flaw that is evident
to only a small fraction of committee members. These members will vote against it
on grounds of prudence, even though they are not certain whether the flaw would
prove fatal. By contrast, most members of the committee do not see the flaw in the
default strategy and vote for it with high confidence. The majority therefore endorse
the wrong strategy, and do so even if votes were weighted by confidence, because the
true experts are relatively less confident about the merits of the two proposals.
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical diagnosis of this problem and proposed a solution.
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Standard crowd wisdom methods can, in principle, measure the actual distribution of
opinions to a high level of precision. However, to correctly interpret the meaning of
the actual distribution, one needs to know what distributions to expect under different
hypotheses. Standard methods therefore miss a crucial piece of information, namely
counterfactual distributions of opinions. Our possible world model in Chapter 2,
shows that information about counterfactual distributions may be indirectly obtained
by eliciting respondents' predictions of the distribution of opinions in the sample. An
ideal Bayesian respondent would compute such a predicted distribution as a weighted
average of opinions expected under different hypotheses, with the weights equal to her
posterior probabilities over these hypotheses. If these predictions are consistent with
a Bayesian model of belief updating, one can prove for the special case of two mutually
exclusive alternatives, that the best alternative is not the one with the most votes, nor
the one endoersed with most confidence, but rather the alternative that receives more
votes than predicted. We called this selection mechanism the 'surprisingly popular'
algorithm. 1
As shown in Chapter 2, the surprisingly popular algorithm can be extended to
multiple choice questions, and is guaranteed to select the best answer under very
general conditions, as the sample size goes to infinity. The empirical evidence that we
discussed suggests that the surprisingly popular algorithm can robustly outperform
unweighted or weighted averaging of opinions, even without additional statistical
modeling . However, the surprisingly popular algorithm has several limitations.
First, it outputs only a single most likely answer, but one would prefer to obtain
a complete posterior probability distribution over answers and, in the multiple choice
case, rank answers according to posterior likelihood. Second, the surprisingly popular
algorithm assumes that respondents are noiseless Bayesians, whereas the votes and
vote predictions of actual respondents are likely to contain noise. Third, the surpris-
'We can illustrate the use of the suprisingly popular algorithm on the above example. In the
above example, committee members voting for the default strategy, who are unaware of the flaw,
are likely to predict that almost everyone will share their view, and vote for the default. Those
who vote against the default expect to be in the minority, as the flaw is subtle and not likely to be
recognized. Thus, the percent of votes for the default strategy will fall short of expectations, while
the percent voting for the alternative will exceed expectations. The surprisingly popular algorithm
will thus correctly reject the default alternative.
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ingly popular algorithm does not allow for other kinds of information to be easily
incorporated, for example when external information, such as base rate frequencies,
is available. Fourth, the surprisingly popular answer does not apply across multi-
ple questions, and so potentially discards information that could be used to identify
individual respondent expertise.
To address these limitations, we develop a generative possible world model (GPWM)
that models how the vots and vote predictions that people give are generated and so
casts the aggregation problem as one of statisitcal inference. The GPWM yields a
posterior probability distribution over world states, rather than outputting only the
most likely answer. Unlike other Bayesian hierarchical models, the GPWM can be
applied at the level of a single question without requiring data about a respondent's
historical accuracy. When respondents answer multiple questions, the GPWM can be
applied across questions and used to infer respondent expertise. The GPWM mod-
els noise in the votes and vote predictions of respondents, and allows for external
information to be easily incorporated. Unlike market-based mechanisms, it is not re-
stricted to events with outcomes that can be described by a precise contract and since
the inputs used by the GPWM are the same as those required by the Bayesian Truth
Serum (Prelec, 2004), honest answers can be easily incentivized. By developing the
GPWM, we show how to combine statistical aggregation techniques with predictions
about others, suggesting new future directions.
In the rest of this chapter, we motivate and formalize the GPWM. We describe a
version of the model that can be applied to single questions and then extend it to learn
the expertise of respondents answering multiple questions. For context, we compare
our model to the Bayesian cultural consensus model (Karabatsos and Batchelder,
2003; Oravecz et al., 2014, 2013) and a Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model (Lee and
Danileiko, 2014). The GPWM shows good performance on a range of domains, in
inferring both correct answers and the expertise of respondents. We conclude by
discussing assumptions of the GPWM and possibilities for how to extend it.
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3.1 The generative possible world model
3.1.1 The generative possible world model for single questions
We present the generative possible world model (GPWM) for single questions, and
in the next section discuss a version for multiple questions that includes a parameter
for respondent expertise. We present a model for binary questions, and later consider
alternatives and extensions, including to non-binary multiple choice questions.
3.1.1.1 Ideal Bayesian respondents with common knowledge of the pos-
sible world model (PWM), but asymmetric information
The following model (Prelec et al., 2017), which was presented in Chapter 2, under-
lies the surprisingly popular algorithm, and is described here for the case of binary
questions, two signals, and a cutoff voting rule. Suppose that N respondents an-
swer a binary question. Each answer to the question corresponds to a world state
Q c {A, B}, and the correct answer, given the available evidence, corresponds to
the actual world state denoted Q*. Respondent r receives a private signal T', but
does not know the actual world state. There are the same number of possible sig-
nals as there are possible world states with T' E {a, b} for binary questions. Re-
spondents are exchangeable except for the signal that they receive. Respondents
have common knowledge of the joint distribution of worlds and signals p(Q, T'), re-
ferred to as the possible world model (PWM).2 The PWM is unconstrained (ex-
cept that to avoid degeneracies p(Q I) > 0, p(T' = i) > 0 for all worlds
I and signals i). The probability of respondent r receiving signal k is given by
p(Tr = k(Q = Q*) = p(Q = Q*,Tr = k)/p(Q = Q*). An ideal Bayesian respondent r
receiving signal k has two kinds of beliefs. First, a posterior distribution over worlds,
computed by Bayes rule, so that their belief that the world is in state j is
p(Q = jIT' = k) = p(T' = k|Q = j )p(Q = j)/p(T' = k).
2In formally describing the models in this chapter, we use the term 'possible world model' (PWM)
to refer only to this joint distribution, rather than any of our other assumptions about how respon-
dents vote and predict the votes of others.
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Second, a posterior distribution over the signals received by an arbitrary respondent s,
computed by marginalizing over possible worlds, so that their belief that respondent
s received signal j is
p(Ts = j|Tr = k) = Zp(T' = jIQ = i)p(Q = i|T = k).
Given these two posterior distributions, respondent r provides two kinds of informa-
tion to the aggregator. First, a vote Vr E {A, B} for whichever world has maximum
probability under their posterior distribution over worlds
Vr = argmaxp(Q jTr = k)
jE{A,B}
Second, a prediction of the fraction of respondents who vote for each option, which
is equivalent to the probability of an arbitrary respondent voting for each option.
This can be obtained by summing over the probabilities of signals which would lead
to a respondent voting for a particular option. The prediction of the fraction of
respondents voting for option A is thus
p(Vs = A|Tr = k) = E p(T' = jITr = k)p(Vs = AITS = j)
jE{a,b}
where the probability that a respondent who receives signal j votes for option A is
p(VS = AlT' = j) = l{p(Q AITs = j) > 0.5}.
Unlike many standard aggregation models that put constraints on the PWM such
that that the consensus answer is correct (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996), the PWM
in the model above is unconstrained. Hence, the correct answer cannot be otained
from only vote frequencies, or from the full posterior distribution over worlds from
every respondent. The solution presented in Chapter 2, is to additionally elicit from
respondents their predictions about the votes of others, and select the answer which
has an actual vote frequency exceeding the vote frequency which the group predicts.
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We now build on this model to overcome the limitations described above of simply
selecting the surprisingly popular answer.
3.1.1.2 The generative possible world model (GPWM)
The generative possible world model (GPWM) is a Bayesian hierarchical model (Rossi
et al., 2005), specifically a probabilistic generative model (Jordan, 2004; Kollar and
Friedman, 2009). The graphical model (Jordan, 2004; Kollar and Friedman, 2009)
for the single question GPWM is shown in Figure 3-1. The graphical model shows
how unobserved latent parameters (unshaded nodes) are sampled and how observed
votes and vote predictions (shaded nodes) are generated for each respondent. The
GPWM maintains the structure of the model above, with Bayesian respondents who
have common knowledge of the PWM, receive a signal, and formualte posterior dis-
tributions over both worlds and the votes of others. The GPWM makes three changes
to the model above: (1) abstract distributions are replaced with parametric distribu-
tions, (2) a sampling process for the PWM is specified, (3) a noise model for votes
and vote predictions is introduced, along with the appropriate noise parameters. The
complete GPWM for single questions is summarized in statistical notation at the end
of this section.
3.1.1.3 Parametric distributions
To enable statistical inference, a parametric form for each distribution in the GPWM
must be specified. To specify a parametric form for the PWM, it is decomposed into
a prior over worlds and a set of distribution over signals conditional on the world
state. For binary questions, the prior over worlds is given by T = (o, 1 - To)
where p(Q = A) = To. The actual world is sampled from a categorical distribution
with this prior over world states. We refer to the distribution of signals conditioned
on world states as the signal distribution S, and represent it in the binary case
as a 2 x 2 left stochastic matrix where the iI-th entry gives the probability of an
arbitrary respondent receiving signal i when Q* = I (fixing an ordering of world states











Figure 3-1: The single question generative possible world model (GPWM) shown
using plate notation. This model of how votes and vote predictions are generated is
used to infer a posterior distribution over latent variables, including the correct world
state, given observed data from respondents. Nodes are random variables, shaded
nodes are observed, an arrow from node X to node Y denotes that Y is conditionally
dependent on X, a rectangle around variables indicates that the variables are repeated
as many times as indicated in the lower right corner of the rectangle (Jordan, 2004;
Kollar and Friedman, 2009).
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distribution with the probabilities of the signals given by the Q*-th column of the
signal distribution matrix. If Q* = I, then we refer to signal i as the correct signal.
3.1.1.4 Sampling a PWM
To sample the PWM, we sample a world prior and a signal distribution indepen-
dently. The prior probability that the world is in state A, i.e. XFo, is sampled from
a Beta(1, 1) distribution. The signal distribution is sampled uniformly from the set
of left stochastic matrices obeying the constraint that Sei > Sij for all i, j 4 i. That
is, we impose the constraint that p(Tr = iJQ = I) > p(Tr = iJQ = J) for all signals
i and worlds I, J $ I. This generates a signal distribution such that signal i is more
probable in world I than in any other world and imposes a constraint on the world
in which a given signal is more likely, not a constraint on which signal is more likely
for a given world. This does not imply that the majority of respondents receive a
signal corresponding to the correct answer. That is, this prior over signal distribu-
tions guarantees that signal i is more likely to be received in world I than in world
J, but allows signal i to be less likely than signal j in world I. For example, such a
signal distribution may put probability 0.8 on signal a in world A and probability
0.7 on signal a in world B and thus have signal a be more likely than signal b in
both worlds, leading to an incorrect majority if the actual world is B. The constraint
that we place on the signal distribution allows one to index signals and world states
and makes the model identifiable, analogous to imposing an identifiability constraint
to alieviate the label switching problem when doing inference on mixture models
(Diebolt and Robert, 1994; Jasra et al., 2005).
3.1.1.5 Noisy voting
A respondent's vote is modeled as a softmax decision function of their posterior
distribution over world states, with the temperature of the softmax function given
by a voting noise parameter Nv. The voting noise parameter is sampled from a
Gamma(3, 3) distribution. The parameters of this prior distribution were fixed in
advance of running the model on the datasets.
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3.1.1.6 Noisy vote predictions
Respondents give their prediction M' of the fraction of the group who vote for each
answer. For binary questions, M' is completely specified by the fraction of people
predicted to vote for option A. A respondent's prediction of this fraction is sampled
from a Normal distribution truncated to the unit interval, with a mean given by their
Bayesian posterior distribution on an arbitrary respondent voting for A and variance
NM, a prediction noise parameter that is identical for all respondents, and which is
is sampled uniformly from [0, .5].
3.1.1.7 Forward sampling and inference
We now summarize how votes and vote predictions are generated according to the
GPWM. A PWM, that is a prior distribution over worlds and a signal distribution, is
sampled as specified above, a world state is sampled conditional on the world prior,
and the world and signal distribution are used to sample a signal for each respon-
dent. Noise parameters are sampled from the specified priors. Respondents compute
posterior distributions over worlds and the votes of others, and these are used to
noisily sample votes and vote predictions for each respondent, given the noise param-
eters. For concreteness, we summarize below the complete GPWM using statistical
notation. For notational convenience, rather than denoting worlds by {A, B} and
signals by {a, b} we represent both worlds and signals by {0, 1} so that we do not
require categorical distributions. We introduce notation for several matrices that can
be computed by any respondent, given their common knoweldge of the PWM. The
matrix F gives the marginal distribution over signals, W gives the posterior probabil-
ities over worlds conditional on each signal being received (Wij = p(Q = ilTr = ),
and X gives the posterior distribution over signals conditional on the signal that was
received (Xij = p(Ts = iIT' = j)). The GPWM specifies the following generative
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S = max({S', S"})
I - max({S', S"})
T|S, Q* ~ Bernoulli(Si,'*)
F = ST
min({S', S"})
1 - min({S', S"})J
W So,o'o/Fo S1 ,&o/ 
F1 1
So,11 1 /Fo S1,1 P1 /F 1 J
Nv Gamma(3, 3)
V' Nv, W, T' Bernoulli(exp(W1,Tr/Nv)/(exp(Wo,Tr /Nv) + exp(W1,Tr /Nv))
X=SW
NM ~ Unif orm([0, .5])
MI, NM, T' ~ Normal oll(XO,TrJ[{ W1,o > 0.51+ X1,Tr1I{W1,1 > 0.5}, NM)
Inference via Markov Chain Monte Carlo is discussed later, and uses the observed
vote and vote prediction of each respondent to infer the value of all latent variables,
including a posterior distribution over answers.
3.1.2 The generative possible world model for multiple ques-
tions
Figure 3-2 displays a version of the GPWM for data from respondents who answer
multiple questions. It incorporates respondent-level expertise, learnt across Q ques-













and noise parameters are sampled as for single questions, with no relationship between
these parameters across questions.
Respondent expertise in the GPWM does not reflect the noise in each respon-
dent's answers. Instead, an essential difference relative to other statistical models of
aggregation, is that respondent expertise corresponds to how likely respondents are
to receive the correct signal, rather than how likely respondents are to err in reporting
answers given their signal. We refer to this as 'information expertise' since it reflects
differences in the information or insight that respondents have, not differences in how
much noise they introduce when interpreting this information or insight. That is,
an expert is someone who is likely to receive information diagnostic of the correct
answer, rather than someone who introduces little garbling into the information that
they received. The introduction of information expertise means that in the multiple
question model every respondent no longer has an identical probablity of receiving a
particular signal given by the signal distribution.
The information expertise parameter for respondent r is denoted F, and has a
uniform prior distribution on [0, 1]. if Q* = J, then the probability of receiving signal
j increases linearly with the information expertise and the probability of receiving a
different signal is decreased by the same amount. That is, if Sjj = p then p(Tr =
jIQ* = J) = p + I(1 - p) and likewise the probability of receiving other signals
is decreased by P(1 - p). For example, suppose SaA = 0.4. Then, if F = 0 then
p(Tr = aIQ* = A, IT) = 0.4, if jr = 0.5 then p(Tr aIQ* = A, I) = 0.7, and if
F = 1 then p(T'r aIQ* = A, F) = 1. The information expertise parameter does
not determine the accuracy of a respondent's answer in absolute terms, but rather
relative to the question difficulty. For example, for an easy question where the signal
distribution gives a high chance of receiving the correct signal, even if someone has
an expertise of 0 they will likely still receive the correct signal.
This model of information expertise does not allow for respondents who are less
likely to receive the correct signal than the probability given by the signal distribution.
Of all respondents, the answers of those with expertise 0 are the most uninformative.
If the model included expertise values between 0 and -1, then someone with expertise
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-1 would receive a signal perfectly anti-correlated with the actual world and so provide
the same information content as someone with an information expertise of 1. 3
Respondents are modeled as formulating their personal votes and vote predictions
without taking information expertise into account. That is, each respondent assumes
that all respondents, including themself, have an information expertise of 0. In the
next section, we discuss an extension to the GPWM that allows for respondents to
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Figure 3-2: The multiple question generative possible world model (GPWM) which
is applied across questions, with N respondents answering Q questions. It uses the
single question GPWM, but includes information expertise which affects how likely
an individual is to receive the correct signal.
3Restricting to positive expertise guards against inferring incorrectly that respondents consis-
tently in the minority have expertise such that they receive incorrect signals, and allows the correct
inference that these respondents are actually consistently correct, depending on their predictions.
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3.1.3 Two extensions to the generative possible world model:
confidence and expertise self-knowledge
3.1.3.1 Respondent confidence.
A respondent's confidence is modeled as a noisy report of their Bayesian posterior
probability, conditional on their received signal, on their answer. That is, if respon-
dent r received signal k and voted for answer j, their confidence is a noisy report of
p(Q = j T' = k). A respondent's confidence is assumed to be sampled from a Nor-
mal distribution (truncated between 0 and 1), with a mean given by their Bayesian
posterior on their answer, and variance Nc a paramter that governs how noisy the
confidence reports are of all respondents. For binary questions, respondents should
give a confidence from 50% to 100%, since if someone had less than 50% confidence in
an option they should have voted for the alternative option. We assume a truncated
Normal distribution with support from 0, rather than 0.5, to allow for respondent
error. The confidence noise NC is sampled from a uniform distribution on [0, .5].
Confidence is incorporated both when applying the model to questions separately
and when applying the model across questions.
3.1.3.2 Expertise self-knowledge.
A second extension to the GPWM assumes that respondents know their own infor-
mation expertise, rather than simply assuming it is 0. If respondents assume that
their information expertise is 0 then, although different respondents have different
probabilities of receiving signal i because of their differing expertise, all respondents
who do receive signal i have the same posterior beliefs over worlds and the signals
of other respondents. Suppose instead that a respondent has accurate knowledge of
their own information expertise. This implies that the posterior that they compute
over worlds is
p(Q = i|T' = j, I = e) = p(T' = jQ Q= i, I = e)p(Q = i)/p(Tr = j)
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where
p(T' = AQj = i, F = 0) = Sji + e(1 - Sji).
Assuming that respondents know their own expertise in this way has the effect
that given two respondents receiving the same signal, the respondent who knows that
she has high information expertise will put higher probability on the answer implied
by the signal than will the respondent who believes that he has low information ex-
pertise. The respondents will also put different probabilities on the signals received
by other respondents, since they have differing beliefs about the probability of differ-
ent possible worlds. A significant disadvantage to modeling respondents as knowing
their own information expertise is the increase in computation required for inference.
Specifically, inference is done via Markov Chain Monte Carlo and if respondents know
their own information expertise then the posterior distributions over worlds and sig-
nals, conditional on the received signal, have to be computed separately for every
respondent at every inference step. Neither of these extensions improve performance
on the seven studies we evaluate them on, as shown in Section 3.4.
3.2 Comparison models
For context and to gain insight into the factors affecting the performance of the
GPWM in different settings, we compare the GPWM applied to questions separately
to other methods that can be applied to individual questions: majority voting, select-
ing the answer that is more popular than the group predicts (Prelec et al., 2017), and
the linear and logarithmic pools. We also compare the GPWM applied across mul-
tiple questions to other hierarchical Bayesian models that require multiple questions,
specifically the Bayesian Cultural Consensus model (Oravecz et al., 2013, 2014) and
a Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model (Lee and Danileiko, 2014).
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3.2.1 Bayesian Cultural Consensus
Cultural Consensus Theory is a prominent set of techniques used to uncover the
shared beliefs of a group (Romney et al., 1986; Batchelder and Romney, 1988; Weller,
2007). The theory deals with respondents answering a set of binary questions relat-
ing to the same topic. A respondent's answers are used to infer the extent to which
each individual knows the culturally correct answers and the cultural consensus is
determined by weighting more heavily the answers of culturally competent respon-
dents. Unlike the GPWM, cultural consensus models cannot be applied to single
questions and apply only to questions with binary answers. We specifically compare
our model to a Bayesian hierarchical model called the Bayesian Cultural Consensus
model (Oravecz et al., 2013, 2014).
The Bayesian Cultural Consensus model is applied to N respondents answering
Q binary questions.4 Respondents are indexed with r and questions with q. For each
question q, a respondent r votes for either true or false, denoted by Yq' E {0, 1}, and
there is a culturally correct answer Zq e {0, 1}. For question q, a respondent r knows
and reports Z. with probability Dr and otherwise guesses true with probability g', a
respondent specific guessing-bias. The competence D' of respondent r at answering
question q is given by the Rasch measurement model
Dr O(1 - 6q)
Or(1q 
- j) + q(1 - Or)
which is a function of the respondent's ability Or and the question difficulty 3q. The
competence of a respondent for a question increases with respondent ability, and
decreases with the question difficulty. When respondent ability matches question dif-
ficulty, the probability of the respondent knowing the culturally correct answer for the
question is 0.5. Uniform priors are assumed for all model parameters. The complete
set of answers given by respondents is thus expressed as a probabilistic function of the
culturally correct answer for all questions as well as the difficulty of each question,
and the ability and guessing-bias of each respondent. The posterior distribution over
4 We use consistent notation for all of the models in this chapter, departing from the notation
originally used to describe a model if necessary.
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the culturally correct answer for each question provides the aggregated answer of the
group, and the inferred respondent ability and guessing-bias give information about
each respondent's performance.
3.2.2 A Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model
Outside of cultural consensus theory, a number of hierarchical Bayesian models for
aggregation have been developed that model how people produce their answers given
latent knowledge, and then aggregate information at the level of this latent knowl-
edge. For example, when playing "The Price is Right" game show, bids for a product
may not correspond to knowledge of how much the product is worth (because of the
competive nature of the show), and so aggregating at the level of latent knowledge
rather than bids may give more accurate inferences (Lee et al., 2011b). Such hierar-
chical Bayesian models include models for aggregating over multidimension stimuli,
for example combinatorial problems (Yi et al., 2012) and travelling salesman prob-
lems (Yi et al., 2010b). There are also a number of other statistical models, developed
predominantly for crowdsourcing applications such as sentence annotation or image
labeling, which have the same goal of aggregating information from multiple people
(Raykar et al., 2010; Yan et al., 2011; Welinder et al., 2010; Whitehill et al., 2009;
Bachrach et al., 2012; Kamar et al., 2015; Burnap et al., 2015). Modeling the cognitive
processes behind someone's answer allows individual hetrogeneity to be estimated, for
example the differing knowledge that respondents have in ranking tasks (Lee et al.,
2012) or people's differing levels of noise and calibration when respondent's are an-
swering binary questions using probabilties (Lee and Danileiko, 2014; Turner et al.,
2014). We apply this Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model that incorporates noise and
calibration Lee and Danileiko (2014) to the studies used in this paper, and compare
it to the GPWM.
The Lee and Danileiko model (Lee and Danileiko, 2014) assumes N respondents
answering a set of Q questions. Respondents are indexed by r, questions by q, and the
answer of respondent r to question q is denoted Yr. A respondent's answer gives their
subjective probability that the world is in a particular state, and so Yr E [0, 1]. A
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latent true probability lrq is associated with each question and two respondent-level
parameters determine how respondents report this true probability. A respondent
with calibration parameter Sr perceives a probability or' = 6, log( q ), which assumes
a linear-in-log-odds calibration function. A respondent with expertise o-, then reports
a probability Yq, sampled from a Gaussian distribution centred around their perceived
probabiltiy Or, with variance given by the reciprocal of a,. That is, the larger a-, the
more likely respondent r is to report a probablity close to their perceived probability.
The paramters rq and a, have a uniform prior distribution on the unit interval, and
has a Beta(5, 1) prior.
3.3 Evaluating the models
3.3.1 Data
We evaluate the models by reanalyzing the data from the seven studies discussed in
Chapter 2. Three of these studies ("MIT class states", "Princeton states", and "MIT
lab states") had respondents answer questions about state capitals. For the MIT
lab states study, respondents gave their confidence of being correct on a scale from
50% to 100% and predicted the average confidence given by others. The prediction
of the average confidence given by others is not used in the GPWM, but we return
to this kind of prediction in the discussion section. Two studies ("Art professionals"
and "Art laypeople") had respondents attempt to estimate the price of 20th Century
artworks. In one study ("Lesions"), dermatologists judged whether lesions were benign
or malignant, and in the last study ("Trivia") respondents evaluated the veracity of
statements about trivia.
3.3.2 Applying the Generative Possible World Model
To apply the GPWM, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm was used to perform Markov
Chain Monte Carlo inference, with the signals marginalized out. Truncated Normal
proposal distributions (centred on the current state with different fixed variances for
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each parameter) were used for the world prior, noise, expertise and signal distributions
(maintaining the constraint that the probability of signal a in state A is higher than
in state B), and the opposite world state was proposed at each inference step. For
inference across multiple questions, the question level parameters are conditionally
independent across questions, conditioned on the respondent-level expertise values.
We thus run MCMC chains for each question in parallel with the expertise parameter
fixed, interspersed with an MCMC chain on only the expertise parameter. When
applying the model to each question separately, 50000 Metropolis Hastings steps
were used, 5000 of which were burn-in. When applying the model across multiple
questions, 100 overall Metropolis-Hastings loops were used, the first 10 of which were
burn-in, with each loop containing 2000 steps for the question parameters and 150
steps for the expertise parameter. For all three Bayesian hierarchical models, standard
measures of autocorrelation and convergence were used to ensure that the samples
from the model approximated the posterior.
3.3.3 Applying the Bayesian cultural consensus model
Cultural consensus models assume that there is a unidimensional answer key to the
questions. A heuristic check that the data is sufficiently unidimensional is that the
ratio of the first to the second eigenvalue of the agreement matrix is 3:1 or higher
(Oravecz et al., 2014; Weller, 2007). We compute eigenvalue ratios for each study
using respondents without missing data. Since for the lesions study, some lesions were
seen only by one group we report the eigenvalue ratios separately for each group.This
ratio is 2.76:1 for MIT class states, 2.62:1 for Princeton states, 3.32:1 for MIT lab
states, 2.7:1 for Art laypeople, 8.92:1 for Art professionals, 2.81:1 for Trivia, 10.26:1
for the lesions with the 20 malignant and 40 benign split, and 6.73:1 for the lesions
with the 40 malignant and 20 benign split. Most of the datasets are higher than the
3:1 standard for unidimensionality, and the model performed well on datasets not
meeting this standard. The model learns a respondent-level guessing-bias towards
true, and so for each study one of the answers is coded as true: the states studies and
trivia study explicitly use true and false answers, in the art studies we coded true as
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refering to the high price option (over $30 000), and in the lesions study we coded
true as referring to the malignant option.
The Bayesian Cultural Consensus Toolbox (Oravecz et al., 2014) specicifies the
model using the JAGS (Just Another Gibbs Sampler) model specification, which we
edited to allow for unbalanced observational data, since not every respondent an-
swered every question. In the MIT lab states study and the trivia study occassionally
a respondent missed a question and in the lesions study only about half the respon-
dents answered some questions due to the experimental design. To peform inference
using the model, Gibbs sampling was run for 1000 steps of burn-in, followed by 10
000 iterations, using 6 independent chains and a step-size of two for thinning.
3.3.4 Applying the Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model
The cognitive hierarchy model requires subjective probabilities from respondents and
so we apply the model only to data where this information is available, specifically
the MIT lab states study, the lesions study, and the trivia study. The JAGS model
specification provided by Lee and Danileiko with their paper was used, but edited to
allow for unbalanced observational data. Gibbs sampling was run for 2000 steps of
burn-in, followed by another 10000 iterations, using 8 independent MCMC chains.
3.4 Results
The GPWM is applied both to each question separately and across multiple question.
The Bayesian cultural consensus model and cognitive hierarchy model are only applied
across multiple questions. The cognitive hierarchy model is only applied to studies
where confidences were elicited, whereas the other two models are applied to all
seven studies. Results are shown with respect to the correct answer inferred for
each question as well as the expertise parameters inferred for each respondent. The
generative possible world model allows one to infer a prior over world states and this
is compared to an empirical proxy for common knowledge about the likelihood of a
city being a state capital.
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3.4.1 Inferring the correct answers to questions
Of the three hierarchical Bayesian models discussed, only the GPWM can be applied
to individual questions. There are other aggregation methods, however, that can be
applied to individual questions. For all studies we compute the answer endorsed by the
majority (counting ties as putting equal probability on each answer) and for studies
where confidences were elicited we also compute a linear opinion pool given by the
mean of respondent's personal probabilities (derived from votes and confidences), and
a logarithmic opinion pool given by the normalized geometric mean of the probabilities
that respondents assign to each answer (Cooke, 1991). We also show the result, from
Chapter 2, of selecting the surprisingly popular answer.
Figure 3-3 shows the accuracy of the different methods at selecting the correct
answer in terms of Cohen's kappa coefficient. Cohen's kappa is a standard measure
of categorical correlation where a higher value indicates a higher degree of agree-
ment with the actual answer. We compute it rather than the percentage of questions
correct, since for some of the studies the relative frequencies of the different correct
answers are unbalanced, which means that a method can have high percentage agree-
ment even if it does not discriminate well and is instead biased towards the more
frequent answer. Cohen's kappa is computed as K = Po-Pe where p0 is the relative ob-
served agreement between the method and the actual answer, and p, is the agreement
expected due to chance, given the frequencies of the different answers output by the
method.5 A disadvantage of the kappa coefficient is that it does not take into account
the probabilities output by a method, but only evaluates the answer that a method
selects as most likely. Figure 3-4 shows the result of each method in terms of its
Brier score. The Brier score evaluates probabilities, and a lower score indicates that
a method tends to put high probability on the actual answer. There are a number
5There is not a standard approach to accomodate ties when computing the kappa coefficient for
binary questions. In the case of ties, we construct a new set of answers with double the number of
original answers. Answers which were not ties appear twice in the new set, and answers which were
originally ties appear once as one answer and once as the other answer. The kappa coefficient is
invariant to doubling the number of answers, and the standard error is a multiple of the number of
original questions and so the doubling of the number of answers can be easily accounted for when
computing standard errors.
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of similar formulations of the Brier score which we compute as the average squared
error between the probability given by a method and the actual answer. For methods
that only output an answer, rather than a probability, we take the probabilities to be



























Figure 3-3: Performance of the various methods for aggregation on each dataset in
terms of the kappa coefficient, with error bars indicating standard errors. The hatched
bars show methods that are applied to single questions at a time. Confidences were
only elicited in the studies shown in the bottom row.
We first consider methods that act on each question individually, shown with
hatched bars in Figures 3-3 and 3-4. Studies where confidences were elicited are shown
in the bottom row of each of these figures, and so studies in the bottom row show
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Figure 3-4: Performance of the various methods for aggregation on each dataset in
terms of the Brier score, with error bars indicating bootstrapped standard errors.
The hatched bars show methods that are applied to single questions at a time.
similar answers (the minimum kappa coefficient across studies when comparing the
answers given by the linear and logarithmic pools is 0.86), and so we do not show the
logarithmic pool results. Compared to the other methods that operate on questions
individually, the GPWM applied separately to each question (which we refer to as
GPWM separate) outperforms majority voting, and the linear and logarithmic pool
across studies if we consider the accuracy of the answer selected by each method. This
is displayed with respect to Cohen's kappa in Figure 3-3, but we can also compare
the number of errors more directly. Across all 490 items, GPWM separate improved
on the errors made by majority voting by 27% (p < 0.001, all p-values from a two-
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sided matched pairs sign test on correctness unless otherwise indicated). Across the
210 questions on which confidences were elicited, GPWM separate improved on the
errors made by majority vote by 30% (p < 0.001) and over the linear pool errors
by 20% (p < 0.02). As can be seen, GPWM separate is able to uncover the correct
answer even when applied to questions where the majority is incorrect. In terms of
selecting one of two binary answers, the performance of the GPWM separate and
the surprisingly popular answer is similar (, = 0.9 across the 490 questions, and
the answers are not significantly different by a two-sided matched pairs sign test,
p > 0.2), which is to be expected since they build on the same model of respondent
vote and vote predictions. However, GPWM separate has a better Brier score than the
surprisingly popular answer for all studies, since it produces graded judgments rather
than simply selecting a single answer. This ability to produce graded answers and
reflect appropriate uncertainty in the inferences that can be drawn from respondent
data illustrates one of the important advantages of developing statistical models over
the surprisingly popular answer.
We also show the performance of models that require multiple questions (non-
hatched bars in the figures): the Bayesian cultural consensus model, the cognitive
hierarchy model, and GPWM applied across questions (which we refer to as GPWM
across). GPWM across improves over GPWM separate (p < 0.01), although in terms
of the kappa coefficient this improvement is small except for two of the states-capitals
studies. The Bayesian cultural consensus model also shows good performance across
datasets. It is similar to GPWM across in terms of the kappa coefficient, except
for the MIT states-capitals study where its performance is not as good. This is
also reflected in the difference between the correctness of the two methods in terms
of absolute numbers of questions correct which only slightly favors GPWM across
(p = 0.057). In a later section, we explore differences between GPWM across and the
Bayesian cultural consensus model when there is not a consistent coding of answer
options across questions. The cognitive hierarchy model selects similar answers to the
linear pool (, = 0.92) resulting in similar accuracy at selecting the correct answer, as
measured by Cohen's kappa, but better performance than the linear pool with respect
98
to the probability it assigns to the correct answer, as measured by Brier score. The
cognitive hierarchy model shows similar performance to the cultural consensus model
and GPWM across on the trivia and lesions studies, but impaired performance on
the MIT lab states study. This illustrates a general difference between GPWM across
and the cognitive hierarchy model. In settings where confidence-weighted voting tends
to be correct, the cognitive hierarchy model will perform well and may exceed the
performance of the GPWM since it allows for differences in individual calibration.
In settings where confidence-weighted voting tends to be incorrect, however, GPWM
across has the potential to improve on the cognitive hierarchy model, with the caveat
that this requires respondents to produce useful predictions about the answers of
others.
We earlier discussed two possible extensions to the GPWM: incorporating con-
fidences and assuming that respondents are aware of their own expertise. On the
questions where confidences were elicited, we applied the GPWM with confidences
incorporated both for questions separately and across questions. Applied to ques-
tions separately, the answers given by the GPWM with and without confidences were
similar (K= 0.9 on the selected answers, r, = 0.87 on the returned probabilities).
This was also the case when applying the GPWM across questions with and without
confidences (K= 0.9, r, = 0.86). Hence, incorporating confidence made little differ-
ence to the GPWM results. We also applied GPWM across (both with and without
confidences) assuming that individuals knew their own expertise. This again made
little difference to the results for either the model without confidences (K =0.9 for
answers, r8 = 0.91 for probabilities) or the model incorporating confidences (K = 0.9
for answers, r, = 0.92 for probabilities).
3.4.2 Inferring latent parameters: the world prior versus state
capital mention frequencies
The GPWM allows one to infer the value of latent question-specific parameters other
than the world state, such as the complete signal distribution and the prior over
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worlds. The signal distribution gives information both about how people may vote in
counterfactual world states, and about the actual distribution of information available
to people. The world prior allows inferences about people's prior beliefs and what
information is common knowledge amongst all respondents. The accuracy of these
values is difficult to assess in general, but we analyze the inferred world prior in the
state capitals studies. Previous work in cognitive science has demonstrated that in a
variety of domains people have prior beliefs that are well calibrated with the actual
statistics of the world (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006). We use the number of Bing
search results of the city-state pair asked about in each question (specifically the
search query "City, State", for example "Birmingham, Alabama") as a proxy for the
frequency of mentions of the city-state pair. For all three state capitals studies, the
world prior on the named city being the capital (inferred from GPWM separate) has
a moderate correlation with the Bing search count results under a log transform (MIT
class: rs = 0.48,p < 0.001, Princeton: rs = 0.49,p < 0.001, MIT lab: rs = 0.55,p <
0.001). This suggests that the GPWM inferences about the world prior may reflect
common knowledge about how salient the named city is in relationship to the state.
3.4.3 Inferring respondent-level parameters
The GPWM applied across questions as well as the cultural consensus model and
cognitive hierarchy model all infer respondent-level expertise parameters, and these
inferences can be compared to the performance of individual respondents. Figure 3-5
shows the correlation of these respondent-level expertise parameters with the kappa
coefficient of each respondent. For studies where confidences were elicited, the pattern
of results is the same if respondent performance is measured using the Brier score.
Both the GPWM expertise parameter and the cultural consensus competence
parameter show high correlation with individual respondent accuracy. For the 220
total respondents in all the studies, the correlation of respondent-level accuracy with
GPWM expertise is r=0.79 and with cultural consensus competence is r = 0.74 (all
respondent-level correlations are significant at the p<0.005 level). For the 97 respon-
dents in the studies where confidences were elicited, the correlation of respondent-
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Figure 3-5: Pearson correlations of inferred respondent-level expertise parameters
from each model against the accuracy of each respondent evaluated by their kappa
coefficient. Error bars show bootstrapped standard errors.
level accuracy with GPWM expertise is r=0.78, with cultural consensus expertise is
r =0.70, and with cognitive hierarchy expertise is r = 0.29.
Two other pieces of information that may help predict a respondent's performance
are the fraction of times that the respondent was in the majority, and the fraction
of times that the respondent voted true. We examine the relationship between the
expertise parameters and respondent performance if we partial out these two additonal
factors. Across all studies, this partial correlation of respondent-level acurracy with
GPWM expertise is r= 0.85 and with cultural consensus competence is r = 0.74.
Across the studies where confidence was elicited, this partial correlation of respondent-
level accuracy with GPWM expertise is r = 0.76, with cultural consensus competence
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is r = 0.70, and with cognitive hierarchy expertise is r = 0.34.
For completeness, we also report on the other respondent-level parameters inferred
by the models. The cultural consensus guessing-bias parameter has a high correlation
with the fraction of questions for which a respondent says true (r = 0.95), but not
with the accuracy of a respondent (r = -0.11, p > .10). The cognitive hierarchy
model calibration parameter has a correlation of r = 0.38 with the kappa accuracy of
respondents for the studies where confidence was elicited.
3.5 Factors affecting model performance
3.5.1 The consistency of answer coding across questions
Within the studies analyzed in this chapter, which answer was coded as true and
which as false did not vary across questions. This need not always be the case, for
example respondents could answer questions which sometimes ask whether a piece
is worth more than $30,000 and sometimes ask whether a piece is worth less than
$30,000. More generally, respondents may answer questions where there is simply
no consistent ordering of the answer options across questions, for example questions
asking which of two novel designs for a product will be more successful where the
novel products in each question have no consistent labels.
To examine how the statistical models would fare in such situations, we con-
structed a half-reversed dataset where the questions in the first half of each study are
coded in reverse, and another half-reversed dataset where the questions in the second
half of each study are coded in reverse. To reverse a question, the correct answer
to the question is swapped (i.e. true becomes false and vice versa) as is the answer
of each respondent. Additionally, a respondent's prediction of the fraction of people
voting true becomes their prediction of the fraction of people voting false. Figure
3-6 shows how the three Bayesian hierarchical models perform when applied on the
half-reversed datasets in terms of average kappa coeffience.










-0.2 MIT class states
IJ
Princeton states Art professionals Art laypeople MIT lab states
Datasets with half the questions coded in reverse
I
Lesions Trivia questions
Figure 3-6: Performance of the three Bayesian hierarchical aggregation models when
applied to the two half-reversed datasets. For each model, its kappa coefficient aver-
aged across the two half-reversed datasets is shown. Error bars are standard errors.
affected by a non-consistent ordering of answer options across questions: the average
of their kappa coefficients for the two half-reversed datasets were within 0.05 of the
original kappas for every study. This was not the case for the Bayesian cultural
consensus model, which had much lower performance on some of the studies when
applied to the half-reversed datsets. In particular, for the MIT class states study,
the Princeton states study, and both art studies it had a kappa of approximately 0
for the half-reversed datasets, in comparison to its good performance on the original
datasets. This decrease in performance of the Bayesian cultural consensus model is
because it relies, in part, on a respondent parameter which measures a bias towards








so can perform well across questions that do not have a consistent coding of answer
options.
3.5.2 The role of vote predictions
Since personal votes alone are insufficient to determine the correct answer if one does
not assume that the correct signal is most probable, the GPWM also uses predictions
about the votes of others. We evaluate the role of these predictions in the GPWM
by lesioning the GPWM to ignore such predictions. When the GPWM is lesioned in
this way, it infers answers that are very similar to those selected by majority voting.
Across the seven datasets, the median spearman correlation between the posterior
probability that the lesioned GPWM puts on an answer and the fraction of people
voting for the answer is rs = 0.995.
More generally, even in situations where such predictions are available, these can
be more or less useful depending on how thoughtfully respondents make these predic-
tions and how much variation there is across questions. If everyone always predicts
that 50% of other resondents will answer true for every question these predictions will
not be useful for improving the accuracy of the GPWM inferences.
3.6 Discussion
The GPWM depends on assumptions about: (1) the common knowledge that respon-
dents share, (2) the signals that respondents receive, and (3) the computations that
respondents make and how they communicate the results of these computations. We
discuss each of these assumptions in turn, and the possible extensions to the GPWM
that they suggest, and also discuss extending the GPWM to non-binary questions.
3.6.1 Knowledge shared by respondents
One set of modeling assumptions concerns the knowledge shared by respondents.
Specifically, the GPWM assumes that respondents share common knowledge of the
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world prior and signal distribution. However, neither of these assumptions are entirely
correct: people do not exactly know these quantites, and beliefs about these quantities
are not identical across people. As discussed when comparing the inferred world
prior to Bing search results, knowledge of the world prior may reflect statistics of the
environment that may be learnt by all respondents. In other cases, expert respondents
may have a better sense of the world prior. For example, in diagnosing whether
somebody has a particular disease based on their symptoms, knowledge of the base
rate of the disease helps diagnosis but may not be known to everyone.
The GPWM could be extended to weaken the common prior assumption in var-
ious ways, although one could not simply assume that everyone had different belief
about the prior over worlds since this would make the model non-identifiable. One
could assume instead, for example, that respondents receiving the same signal share a
common prior over worlds, but that respondents receiving different signals have differ-
ent prior beliefs.' Alternatively, one could develop models where all respondents had
noisy access to the actual world prior and signal distribution, and formulated beliefs
about the knowledge that other respondents had about these quantities. For exam-
ple, each respondent could sample from a distribution centred on the actual world
prior and actual signal distribution. In the case of respondents answering many ques-
tions, the model could include parameters that governed the accuracy of a particular
respondent's knowledge of these distributions. One could also incorporate domain
knowledge available to the aggregator into the hyperprior over the world prior. For
example if there is external knowledge of the base rate frequency of benign versus
malignant lesions, a hyperprior could be chosen that would put more probability on
a world prior that matched this base rate.
3.6.2 Signal structure
The GPWM assumes that there are the same number of signals as world states.
It further assumes that the signals themselves have no structure: they are simply
6In this case, the model would require assumptions about what respondents believed about the
prior possessed by respondents receiving other signals.
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samples from {a, b} (in the case of two worlds) with signal a more common in world
A. This treats the information or insight available to a respondent coarsely in that
it does not allow for more kinds of information available to respondents than there
are answers to a question, or for respondents with different pieces of information to
endorse the same answer. Models with more signals than worlds could be developed,
requiring constraints on the worlds in which different signals were more probable. For
example, signals could be generated from a hierarchical sampling process where each
signal was a tuple with the first element indicating the world in which the signal was
most likely and the second element indicating the rank of the probability of that signal
amongst other signals with the same first element. That is, the signal distribution
could be such that signal b3 , say, would be more likely in world b than in any other
world, and of the other signals more likely in world b than in any other world it
was the third most probable in world b. More generally, models with other kinds of
assumptions about the signals that respondents receive could be developed to more
faithfully model the information available to respondents when dealing with complex
questions. For example, respondents could receive varying numbers of signals, a mix
of public and private signals, or signals that are not simply categorical variables but
rather have richer internal structure.
3.6.3 Respondent computations
The GPWM assumes that respondents compute Bayesian posteriors over answers and
the votes given by others, and communicate the result of their computations without
noise. An alternative is to model respondents as more plausible boundedly-rational
agents, rather than simply as noisy Bayesians. For example, the Bayesian cogni-
tive hierarchy model recognizes, based on work in the psychology of decision making
(Zhang and Maloney, 2012), that respondents will be differentially calibrated with
respect to the probabilities that they perceive and a similar calibration parameter
could be included in the GPWM for the predictions of others answers. Modeling
predictions of other people could also incorporate what is known about this process
from social psychology. As just one example, as well as showing a false-consensus
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effect, people sometimes also exhibit a false-uniqueness effect such that they do not
take their own answer sufficiently into account when making their predictions (Cham-
bers, 2008; Suls and Wan, 1987). Predictions of the answers of others could thus be
modeled as resulting from a mixture of a respondent's prior over signals (i.e. their
knowledge of the signal distribution) and their posterior over signals with the mixture
weight given by a respondent-level false-uniqueness parameter.
In the version of the GPWM described in this chapter, we allow for noise in a
respondent's vote, but do not assume that respondents take this noise into account
when predicting the votes of others. Furthermore, respondents do not make pre-
dictions about the information expertise of other respondents when making their
predictions about other people. We leave for future work the development of mod-
els where respondents take such factors into account when making predictions about
others, for example by having respondents assume some distribution of information
expertise across other respondents or by having respondents take into account the
noise that they believe is present in the voting of other people.
Given the assumption that respondents compute a posterior distribution over
world states and over the answers of others, additional statistics relating to either of
these posteriors could be elicited and modeled. For example, in the MIT lab states
study respondents were asked to predict the average confidence given by other respon-
dents, which can be computed from these two posteriors. Such additional information
could potentially help sharpen the model inferences. In practice, communicating such
questions to respondents, respondent difficulty in reasoning about such questions, and
respondent fatigue all impose constraints on the amount of additional data that could
be usefully elicited in this manner. As well as eliciting other information from respon-
dents, a different source of information is the actual answer to questions that have
previously been asked and which have subsequently resolved. For example, if a group
of respondents makes sales forecasts every quarter, the results of previous quarters
will become known. By fixing the world state of such questions to their known actual
value, the performance of the model on subsequent questions can be improved since
the model will have better inferences about the information expertise of respondents.
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3.6.4 Non-binary questions
Lastly, we discuss extending the GPWM to non-binary multiple choice questions.
Most of this extension is straightforward, since the conditional distributions used in
the model have natural non-binary counterparts. The world prior becomes a multi-
nomial distribution, and the hyperprior a Dirichlet distribution, rather than a Beta
distribution. The signal distribution for each world is likewise a multinomial distri-
bution in the non-binary case. Given such distributions, respondents can compute a
posterior distribution over worlds and the answers of others. Respondent votes can
be modeled with a softmax decision rule given the Bayesian posterior over multiple
possible worlds. Respondents can compute a Bayesian posterior distribution over the
votes of others, but a model for adding noise to this posterior in the non-binary case
is also required. One possibility is to sample from a truncated Normal distribution
around each element of the posterior and then normalize the resultant draws to sum to
1, another is to sample from a Dirichlet distribution with a mean or mode determined
from the Bayesian posterior and an appropriate noise parameter.
3.7 Conclusion
We have presented a generative possible world model that builds on the model of votes
and vote predictions underlying selecting the surprisingly popular answer, while over-
coming some of the limitations of the surprisingly populr answer. It shares some of
the advantages of market-based mechanisms, for example it can be applied to single
questions and can identify an expert minority, while sharing some of the advantages of
existing statistical models, for example it can infer expertise across questions and does
not suffer from the problems that can arise when individuals interact. The generative
possible world model shows good performance both when applied to questions sep-
arately and when applied across multiple questions. It maintains this performance
even when answers across questions do not have a consistent ordering. While the
generative possible world model that we have proposed suggests multiple possible
extensions and directions for future research, it is already a powerful method for
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aggregating the beliefs of multiple individuals.
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Chapter 4
Open-ended questions and richer
predictions about others
This chapter discusses joint work with Drazen Prelec and Shane Frederick, and sub-
section 4.4.1 is joint work with Drazen Prelec and Sebastian Seung.
4.1 Introduction
Thus far in this thesis we have considered how asking people to predict the answers of
others enables one to aggregate information from respondents answering categorical
questions where the set of possible answers is known in advance. In this chapter, we
extend our aggregation method to apply to questions where the space of answers is
unknown prior to asking respondents for their opinions. In aggregating information
about such questions, we will ask respondents for a richer kind of prediction about the
opinions of others. We use these richer predictions to not only aggregate information
about answer spaces that are unknown ex ante, but also hope to use them to shed
more light on how people think about other people, especially people different from
themselves. We use respondents' own answers and their predictions about the answers




To aggregate information by selecting the surprisingly popular answer, we require
predictions of the probability that other respondents will endorse each answer. As
we have seen in Chapter 2, obtaining such probabilities is fairly straightforward when
the answer space is simply a few possible options known in advance, as we can simply
ask respondents to predict the percentage of respondents they believe will endorse
each answer option. When this is not the case, we need to ask participants to make
other kinds of predictions so that we can impute the necessary probabilities over the
space of answers. When the answer space is categorical but unknown in advance,
we propose asking participants to predict the three answers that they believe will
be given most frequently by participants in the sample, and to predict what fraction
of particpants will give each such answer that they predicted. We propose that to
impute a respondent's prediction of the fraction of people endorsing other answers
we simply partition each respondent's remaining prediction probability mass evenly
amongst the other answers given by participants. For example, a respondent r may
predict the three answers that they believe will be most commonly give, and further
predict that 30% of respondents endorse the first of these, 25% endorse the second,
and 20% endorse the third. If there are, say, two other answers that at least one
respondent endorses, then r will be imputed to predict that 12.5% of respondents
endorse the first of these, and 12.5% endorse the second.1 To obtain more fine-
grained information, one can increase the number of most frequent answers that
people are asked to predict. Once the prediction probabilities are imputed, selecting
the surprisingly popular answer can proceed as described in Chapter 2 for non-binary
questions. As we will discuss, the predictions made by respondents who endorse
different answers shed light on how respondents believe information or insight is
distributed amongst the population.
1Note that someone's imputed second-order predictions may not sum to 100% when they predict
that people will endorse an answer that nobody actually predicts.
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4.3 Cognitive reflection test case study
To illustrate the kinds of predictions that people give for open-ended questions, and
how to use these predictions for aggregation we use (a long version of) the cognitive
reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) as a case study. The test consists of questions
which, for many people, cause an intuitive, incorrect answer to immediately spring to
mind. People who do better on the CRT tend to be more patient, more risk seeking
for losses, and more risk averse for gains (as reflected on hypothetical intertemporal
choice tasks and in hypothetical choices between risky gambles). The CRT does
not simply reflect IQ as measured by the Wonderlic Personnel Test, or self-reported
SAT/ACT scores. The CRT is now widely used - to give just two examples, it is an
excellent predictor of performance on a battery of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases
literature beyond that offered by other measures of cognitive ability (Toplak et al.,
2011) and people with higher CRT scores are more likely to play dominant strategies
in the Beauty Contest game (Brafias-Garza et al., 2012).
4.3.1 Materials and methods
Participants (N = 285) were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk service, re-
stricted to people living in the United States. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of ten questions from an extended cognitive reflection test (developed by Shane
Frederick), with each question answered by at least 26 people. The questions in the
extended cognitive reflection test have a similar flavor to that of the original test,
with the first three questions the same as that of original cognitive reflection test
Frederick (2005), except that the total price of the bat and ball question in the origi-
nal test is $1.10. One of the questions in the extended test ("Mary's mother had four
children. The youngest three are named: Spring, Summer, and Autumn. What is the
oldest child's name?") is particularly nicely illustrative of the open-ended nature of
the domain since the answer is a word rather than a number. Participants could not
preview the questions before opting into the experiment so as to prevent self-selection
into answering particular questions.
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(4) How confident ace you that yaw answer above is corrct, on a scale foam0% (no chaoce my answer is correct) so 100% (rm certain my answer is correct)?
rm 1oo % conidem
Figure 4-1: An example of the elicitation procedure used in the cognitive reflection
test study.
For the single question that they were considering, particpants were asked about
their predictions about other people as well as about their own answer to the question.
An example of the elicitation procedure used is shown in Figure 4-1 Participants were
first asked to predict the first, second, and third most common answer to the posed
question, given by other people answering the same question on Mechanical Turk.
After giving their predictions of the most common answers, participants were asked
to guess the exact percentage of the sample who gave each of these predicted answers.
To make these instructions clear to participants, the table in which they had entered
their answer predictions dynamically expanded to include a column in which they
entered their predicted percentage for each answer. Participants were reminded that
their predicted percentages should sum to less than 100%, unless they believed that
no particpant gave any other response. Lastly, participants were asked for their own
answer, and for their confidence in their answer on a scale from 0% ("no chance my
answer is correct") to 100% ("I'm certain that my answer is correct"). Participants
were paid a flat fee, and received a small bonus payment if their prediction of the
most common answers was correct.
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4.4 Results and analysis
After a technical diversion to show a result that we will use later in our analysis, we
first discuss the kinds of predictions that respondents make, conditional on their own
answers, and then discuss the use of respondent's predictions about others to uncover
the correct answer to each question.
4.4.1 Technical diversion: The surprisingly popular answer for
multiple-choice questions and the Bayesian Truth Serum
This subsection incorporates material from a working paper, Prelec, D. , Seung, S.,
and McCoy, J. (2015), "Identifying wisdom in the crowd by inferring implicit beliefs
about possible worlds".
Later in this chapter, we use a particular formulation of the surprisingly popular
answer for multiple-choice questions to aggregate answers, and additionally analyze
the effect of weighting each respondents answers by the respondent's Bayesian Truth
Serum score. In this subsection, we formalize the relationship between a formulation
of the suprisingly popular answer and the Bayesian Truth Serum score. These techni-
cal details can be skipped if desired, we give a more intuitive motivation for weighting
a respondent's answer by their Bayesian Truth Serum score in the next section.
Recall that in Chapter 2, Theorem 3 we consider the case of more than two
worlds and the same number of signals as worlds, and show that if we assume that
p(ailsi) > p(ailsj) then the correct answer has the highest prediction-normalized vote.
Given this assumption in Theorem 3, we now consider selecting the answer k which
maximizes p(ai. Ivk), that is arg maxk p(ai. Ivk).
Theorem 4. Assume m = n, V(s ) = vi, and p(aisi) > p(a |sl). Let ai. denote the
actual world. Then, the vote for the correct answer is given by arg maxk p(ai.|jvk) -
arg max {log p(vklai.) + Ej wj log '(Vi Ivk) I for any set of weights wj satisfying E w=
1.
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Proof. From Bayes rule,
p(ai vk) _ p(vk ai*-) p(v Ivk)
p(ai.|vj) p(vjIaj-) p(vkvJ )
After taking the logarithm and rearranging terms we have,
1 0P(ViIVk) gP(ai*Ivi)log p(ai.|vk) = log p(vk I aj*) + log P(Vk + log p(v *)
P(VklVj) p(vj lai-)
We perform a weighted average over all j-s, and drop the rightmost term which
does not depend on k, which yields,
arg maxp(a- Vk) =argmax logp(Vkla.) + E>wj log pvy Ivk)
k k p(vklvj)
for any set of weights wj satisfying Ej wj = 1.
Recall from Chapter 2, that the vote of respondent r is denoted Vr and that
if respondent r received signal sk then the prediction of respondent r about the
probability of an arbitrary respondent q receiving signal sj is denoted by p(sJ4s).
We let X4 E {0, 1} indicate whether Vr = k and yj = p(sqIsr). We define zy as the
fraction of respondents voting for j andgjas the geometric mean of the predictions of
the fraction of respondents voting for j. If we let wj = 2y and estimate p(vjlvk) as
the geometric mean of predictions of those who voted Vk we have
arg max p(ai.|Ivk) - arg max{1 x Ur
where
U' = XX, log =kY Xr log Xk+ t log.
k,j k k -
is the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) score (Prelec, 2004) of respondent r, which is
a mechanism to incentivize respondents to answer honestly.
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Own answer correct Own answer incorrect
Most frequent answer correct 46% 0%
Most frequent answer incorrect 28% 0%
Table 4.1: Fraction of times the correct answer was predicted to be the most common
answer split up by questions where the most frequent answer was either correct or
incorrect (rows) and by respondents depending on whether their own answer was
either correct or incorrect (columns).
4.4.2 Predicting the answers of others
We begin by analyzing the answers that people predict that other people will give.
Across all questions, respondents who correctly answered their CRT question listed
the correct answer amongst the three that they predicted 82% of the time and listed
the most frequent wrong answer 88% of the time. If we consider only the answer that
they predicted as most frequent, this was the correct answer 40% of the time and
the most common incorrect answer 42% of the time. Respondents who incorrectly
answered their CRT question listed the correct answer amonst the three that they
predicted 10% of the time and the most common incorrect answer 79% of the time.
For half of the questions, nobody giving an incorrect answer predicted that the cor-
rect answer would be given as one of the three most frequent by other people, but
this was as high as 44% of such respondents for one of the questions. As shown in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we consider what answer people predicted as the most common
and condition this on whether an incorrect answer was given more frequently than
the correct answer for a given question. Respondents were more likely to predict
the most frequent wrong answer as the most common when it actually did have the
highest frequency, irrespective of whether the respondents themselves knew the cor-
rect answer. Respondents who did not know the correct answer never predicted that
it would be the most common answer, although respondents who knew the correct
answer often predicted it was the most common answer, although this happened less
frequently for questions where the majority was incorrect.
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Own answer correct Own answer incorrect
Most frequent answer correct 52% 37%
Most frequent answer incorrect 63% 44%
Table 4.2: Fraction of times the most frequent incorrect answer was predicted to be
the most common answer split up by questions where the most frequent answer was
either correct or incorrect (rows) and by respondents depending on whether their own
answer was either correct or incorrect (columns).
4.4.3 Aggregating information in unknown answer spaces
We now compare aggregation methods for the open-ended CRT task that use predic-
tions about others to those that rely solely on voting or confidence-weighted voting.
We first compute for each question the surprisingly popular (SP) answer, which,
as discussed throughout this thesis, essentially involves normalizing the frequency of
votes for an answer by its predicted frequency of votes. Since there are more than two
endorsed answers for each question, we use the non-binary version of the surprisingly
popular answer. To compute the SP answer, we require a set of possible answers,
vote frequencies for each answer, and vote predictions for each answer, conditional on
the endorsed answer.
We take as the set of possible answers to a question simply the set of all answers
that at least one participant gave as their own answer. Note that if an answer is
predicted by some respondent as one of the most common answers, but no participant
actually gives it as their own answer then it is not included in this set. We impute to
each respondent a prediction over all of the possible answers by using the predictions
they gave for the three answers they predicted to be most common, and distributing
any remaining probability uniformly over the other answers, as discussed in Section
4.2. For 62% of respondents, there was no remaining probability mass since they
predicted that everyone gave one of the three answers that they predicted to be most
common. We discarded the 4% of respondents whose summed predictions for the
three most common answers exceeded 100%.
For each question, we applied Theorem 4 (with wj = Ty and geometric mean for
predictions) to compute the suprisingly popular answer. We also computed which
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answer had the majority vote, and which answer had the highest confidence-weighted
vote. The surprisingly popular answer is correct for all ten questions, whereas major-
ity voting and confidence-weighted voting both result in three errors. Whilst selecting
the surprisingly popular answer is correct for more questions than the other two meth-
ods, this difference is obviously not significant due to the low power of a test with
only ten questions. We thus turn to examining the clarity of verdict given by the
different methods in more detail.
Computing the surprisingly popular answer as above is equivalant to selecting the
answer that is endorsed by Bayesian respondents with the highest average Bayesian
Truth Serum scores, as shown in Section 4.4.1. Instead of averaging the BTS scores
of respondents who vote for the same answer, we can instead use differences between
the predictions that respondents with the same vote give as a further source of in-
formation. That is, we regard the BTS score of a respondent as a measure of their
expertise. We thus compute BTS scores for each respondent to each question. For
each respondent, we have three measures associated with their vote: their BTS score,
their confidence, and the frequency of their vote in the sample. We compare the
strength of these measures at identifying respondents who gave the correct answer in
two different ways.
First, we compare confidence-weighted voting against BTS-weighted voting. We
computed an exponential weighting function, which resulted in a weight wi for respon-
dent i given as wi = efisi where 0 is a free parameter and si is either their standardized
confidence or standardized BTS score.2 The normalized weight assigned to answer k
is thus (Eiwil{vi = k})/Eiwi obtained by summing the weights of respondents whose
vote vi was for answer k, normalized by the sum of the weights of all respondents
for that question. Figure 4-2 shows the result of a paired samples t-test between
the normalized BTS weights on the correct answer versus the normalized confidence
weights, across the ten questions. Irrespective of the choice of B shown in the figure,
normalized weighted voting on the correct answer is higher for BTS than for con-
2 So that BTS scores and confidences are on the same scale, giving neither an advantage, we
standardize them by subtracting from the mean of respondents to the question, and dividing by the
standard deviation. Whether or not we standardize makes little difference to the results.
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Figure 4-2: Results of weighting votes by BTS versus by confidence, using an ex-
ponential function that has a free parameter /3 as described in the text. A paired
samples t-test was computed on the normalized weighted votes, using either BTS or
confidence, assigned to the correct answer and averaged across questions. Note that
for 9 degrees of freedom, a paired samples t-test is significant at the a = 0.05 level
when t9 = 1.833.
fidence, indicating that the BTS score, which is obtained from a respondent's own
answer and vote prediction, is a better measure of respondent expertise.3
Figure 4-3 shows how the weights derived from either BTS scores or confidence
differ for individual questions for two representative values of 3.4 For these two repre-
sentative values of/3, the normalized BTS-weighted vote is higher than the normalized
confidence-weighted vote on the correct answer for every question.
3 Setting 8 = 0, would result in the same answers for confidence-weighted voting and BTS-
weighted voting since this is equivalent to the fraction of respondents voting for each answer. At
3 = 0, the t-statistic is thus undefined since the standard deviation of the differences between the
two methods is zero. At low weights, say 3 = .1, the weight BTS assigns to the correct answer is only
slightly higher than the weight from confidence judgments (the average difference is 0.02 at 3 = .1)
but since the standard deviation is so small this results in fairly large values of the t-statistic. The
higher the choice of /, the more weight put on a few respondents with the highest scores.
4 One could treat the normalized weights as probabilities and compute a Brier score for each
method. This gives qualitatively similar results, with BTS weighting outperforming confidence
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Figure 4-3: BTS-weighted voting versus confidence-weighted voting for individual
questions given two representative settings of 3 in the exponential weighting function.
BTS-weighted voting is higher for the correct answer than confidence-weighted voting
for every question.
Second, we evaluate the mean accuracy of subsets of respondents selected accord-
ing to three different expertise measures: the frequency of their answer in the sample,
their confidence, and their BTS score. We selected subsets of respondents of every size
1 through 26 (the minimum number of respondents answering a question) adding re-
spondents to a subset based on each of the three expertise measures being compared.
That is, we constructed a subset of size 1 with the respondent having the highest
BTS score, another such subset with the respondent having highest confidence, and
a third subset of size 1 with the respondent giving the most frequent answer. Some-
times, especially for subsets based on the frequency of the answer, there were multiple
respondents having the same score. In this case, we assigned everyone with the same
score to the relevant subset. For example, if we were assigning subsets based on BTS
score and four people were tied for the highest BTS score, then the subsets consisting
of 1, 2, 3, and 4 people would all be the same and all contain these four people.
For each selected subset of respondents for each of the three measures, we com-
puted the mean accuracy of respondents in the subset, averaging over all ten questions
(Figure 4-4). The average accuracy of of subsets of respondents across the 26 sized






of respondents or the typicality of their vote (paired sample t-tests give t = 7.4,
p < 0.001 for BTS versus confidence subsets and t = 7.6, p < 0.001 for BTS versus
typicality subsets).
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Figure 4-4: Mean accuracy of respondents in subsets selected on the basis of either
frequency of answers, confidence, or BTS scores. A subset of each size is selected for
each question, and results are shown averaged over all ten questions.
We can also show the same analysis for each question individually (4-5). Subsets
of respondents selected on the basis of BTS scores consistently start with the highest
accuracy and accuracy decreases as more respondents are included. Questions for
which the majority is correct obviously start with accurate subsets when these subsets
are selected on the basis of answer frequency. Confidence is not a reliable method
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Figure 4-5: Mean accuracy of respondents in subsets selected using various methods,
shown for each question individually. Each rown shows a single question.
4.5 Discussion
As can be seen from the results and analysis above, predictions about the answers of
others give valuable information for aggregating answers to a cognitive reflection test.
The cognitive reflection test questions are open-ended, and so we could not simply
ask respondents to predict the distribution of people giving pre-specified answers,
but rather asked them to predict the most common answers that people would give.
The successful use of these predictions shows both that people were able to make
such predictions and, moreover, that there was enough information in predictions
about only the most common answers that the entire distribution was unnecessary.
In section 4.4.2, which analyzed the predictions that people made as a function of the
correctness of their own answer and whether the majority was correct, we saw that







requiring deliberation versus the incorrect, intuitively salient answer) gave different
predictions about the answers given by others. In particular, people who gave the
correct answer were aware that many people would give a different answer to their
own: the incorrect but intuitively salient answer.
There are a number of weaknesses of the study above, which could be addressed
through future work. In particular, because we have only ten questions we are limited
with respect to the amount of power we have. In this sample, the majority was
correct for questions for which, in other samples, the majority is often incorrect
Frederick (2005), making it more difficult to assess the advantage of vote predictions.
Participants also answered only a single question, making it impossible to look for
individual differences, or to identify how, for example, intelligence or the amount of
deliberate thinking engaged in correlates with the ability to predict the answers of
others. In future studies, particpants could answer multiplie questions making such
an analysis possible.
The principle of selecting the surprisingly popular answer, examined throughout
this thesis, depends on people making predictions that are informed by the signal that
they receive. The question of what determines the predictions that different people
make is particularly salient in this context, where the predictions are richer and where
people differ in their reasoning abilities rather than differing in the information that
they have. In keeping with Mata et al. (2013), we find that people who gave the correct
answer are aware that others will fall for the intuitive, incorrect answer. Mata et al.
(2013) assess this not through asking respondents to predict the answers that others
will give, but rather through asking respondents to estimate solution rates and their
own relative standing. In later work, respondents who gave the correct answer were
found to be better at using meta cognitive cues (such as amount of thinking time) to
predict the answers of others, since they were aware that deliberative thinkers gave a
different answer to those giving the intuitive answer Mata and Almeida (2014). This
was particularly the case for respondents who reported that they had considered an
intuitive, incorrect answer when thinking about the problem. That respondents with
the correct answer predicted a lower solution rate than respondents with an incorrect
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answer was also reported in the original cognitive reflection test paper (Frederick,
2005). The idea is that, given a dual-process model of cognition, when people consider
such problems an intuitive, incorrect answer comes quickly to mind since the problems
are exactly chosen to lead to such decoy answers. Some people are able to override the
temptation to give this intuitive answer and instead deliberate sufficiently to arrive
at the correct answer. When making predictions about the answers of others, they
are aware of the intuitive answer since they themselves experienced it, and so predict
that some respondents will give it as an answer.
Under this account, the ability of respondents who gave the correct answer to
give more accurate second-order predictions is not because they have superior social
inference abilities in general but rather because they are aware of the intuitive but
incorrect answer. More generally, when attempting to assess individual differences
with respect to social inference skill, it is important to account for differences in
predictions being due to differences in information.
An important question for future study asks about differences in predictions made
by people who gave the same answer. Concretely, for example, what determines which
respondents correctly recognize that they are in the minority when other respondents
with the same answer predict that they are in a majority? One possibility is how
much they considered alternative answers when thinking about the problem, another
is differences in social inference ability. For the cognitive reflection test questions,
many respondents can simulate or theorise about people who are not as deliberate
as themselves, but we do not here have the evidence to infer how far downwards
people can simulate or theorise. For example, given three levels of reasoning ability
in a sample, people in the middle level may be better than people at the top level at
predicting the answers of people in the bottom level. Future work could include, for
example, having people answer multiple such cognitive reflection test type questions
and asking them to predict the answers given by people of differing intelligence or
with differing levels of performance on the cognitive reflection test. As another ex-
ample, one could have chess players of differing levels of ability (as reflected in their
elo ratings) make predictions about the moves of players of various elo ratings to
124
determine whether intermediate players are better than expert players at predicting
the moves of beginners.
It is fitting that the cognitive reflection test case study appears at the end of
this thesis since, although it is a nice illustration of the use of predictions to help
aggregate information, it highlights how much there is still to learn about how people
make predictions about others. Such future research will not only potentially help
aggregate information but also grapple with the rich, complex, and important question




The primary contribution of this thesis has been to develop a method to aggregate
judgments from multiple individuals, such that we can identify truth even when the
majority is wrong. Standard methods such as voting, perhaps weighted by confidence,
leave information on the table since they consider only the actual distribution of votes
without accounting for vote distributions in other counterfactual worlds. We have de-
veloped a theoretical model of Bayesian respondents whereby predictions about the
votes of others give information about such counterfactual distributions. We showed
that, given this model, relying only on the posterior distribution over world states,
as estimated by Bayesian respondents, is insufficient to reliably identify the correct
world state. However, in the case of binary questions, selecting the surprisingly pop-
ular answer theoretically always identifies the correct answer. With the additional
assumption that the respondents voting for an answer place the most probability
on that answer, we show that normalizing votes by vote predictions also identifies
the correct answer for non-binary questions. Across a number of domains, includ-
ing trivia, geography, art, medicine, we show that selecting the surprisingly popular
answer is more accurate, in practice, than standard methods, although we also dis-
cuss circumstances in which the method may fail, for example because of respondents
exhibiting curse of knowledge effects.
Despite the advantages of selecting the surprisingly popular answer, this sim-
ple approach has a number of limitations. We addressed these limitations, using our
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model of Bayesian respondents formulating their own answer and vote predictions, by
developing a probabilistic generative model for information aggregation. This model
provides a posterior distribution across world states and can be applied across mul-
tiple questions to identify respondents with high expertise. Using empirical data, we
showed that this model has a number of advantages over other Bayesian hierarchical
models for aggregation that do not include predictions of others. Both selecting the
surprisingly popular answer and applying the probabilistic generative model require
respondents to make predictions over a set of answers specified in advance. We extend
our aggregation method to settings where this is not the case by using an elicitation
procedure where people instead predict the most common answers that others will
give, and succesfully apply this method to a cognitive reflection test as a case study.
The ability of people to give sensible predictions about the answers of others and
the successful applications of selecting the surprisingly popular answer detailed in
this thesis are encouraging, but there is much scope for future work building on this
success. We take the opportunity here to briefly mention two areas of future research:
practical applications of selecting the surprisingly popular answer, and investigating,
informed by our model, how people make predictions about the answers of others
together with using such predictions in contexts other than aggregation.
While selecting the suprisingly popular answer has been successful in the labo-
ratory, how does it perform in more real-world situations? Future work (some of it
already ongoing) will test the advantages of selecting the surprisingly popular answer
for forecasting tasks with real-world events and experts. For the surprisingly popular
answer to succeed in such contexts will require developing robust, efficient estimation
methods for non-binary questions and methods to apply the surprisingly popular an-
swer to continuous quantities. It will also be necessary to grapple with issues around
applying the surprisingly popular answer when respondents have different incentives,
respondents are in active communication, and institutions wish to know how much
to trust the results. Most current work, including that in this thesis, deals with how
to do aggregation at the level of people's answers to some question, but it would be
desirable to aggregate the information or insights people have about some problem,
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rather than simply their answers.
The theoretical model and empirical results discussed in this thesis raise many
questions about how people make predictions, and how such predictions may be
used. We give just three examples here to give a flavour. First, to what extent are
people able to predict the answers of those with a different level of reasoning ability,
for example are intermediate performers on a reasoning test better able than expert
perfomers to predict the mistakes made by low performers? Second, what accounts
for the false-uniqueness effects observed in our data, and how can this be moderated?
Third, if people fail in systematic ways to predict the beliefs of people with answers
different to their own on some question, can we use this to probabilistically detect
when people are being deceptive about their own answer?
We began this thesis by pointing out that it is often important to be able to
combine information from multiple people, especially when experts disagree. As the
world becomes more complex and information increasingly distributed, this will only
become more important. We hope that the ideas and methods contained in this thesis
will help address this challenge.
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